Search Results
Working Paper
Are banks dead? or, are the reports greatly exaggerated?
Journal Article
Eximbank lending: a federal program that costs too much
Working Paper
Deposit insurance: a reconsideration
This paper undertakes a simple general equilibrium analysis of the consequences of deposit insurance programs, the way in which they are priced and the way in which they fund revenue shortfalls. We show that the central issue is how the government will make up any FDIC losses. Under one scheme for making up the losses, we show that FDIC policy is irrelevant: it does not matter what premium is charged, nor does it matter how big FDIC losses are. Under another scheme, all that matters is the magnitude of the losses. And there is no presumption that small losses are ?good.? We also show that ...
Discussion Paper
Bank regulation and the efficiency of financial intermediation
Working Paper
Organizations in economic analysis
Three economic environments are reviewed, and in each organizations play an essential role. For an adverse selection insurance economy, we find that when mutual insurance arrangements are permitted an equilibrium necessarily exists and is optimal. This example, and the two others, illustrate the problems that may result from imposing organizational structure on an environment rather than permitting the structure to be determined endogenously.
Working Paper
Inflation and financial market performance
An exploration of the cross-sectional relationship between inflation and an array of indicators of financial market conditions, using time-averaged data covering several decades and a large number of countries.
Conference Paper
Inflation, financial markets and capital formation
Working Paper
Equilibrium with Mutual Organizations in Adverse Selection Economies
An equilibrium concept in the Debreu (1954) theory-of-value tradition is developed for a class of adverse selection economies and applied to the Spence signaling and Rothschild-Stiglitz (1976) adverse selection environments. The equilibrium exists and is optimal. Further, all equilibria have the same individual type utility vector. The economies are large with a finite number of types that maximize expected utility on an underlying commodity space. An implication of the analysis is that the invisible hand works for this class of adverse selection economies.