Is it true that insurers benefit from a catastrophic event? Market reactions to the 1995 Hanshin-Awaji earthquake
Previous studies, investigating how the market in general viewed the impact of a big earthquake (e.g., the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake in the San Francisco Bay Area) on insurance firm values, found a positive reaction of insurers' stock prices. This "gaining from loss" may be caused by the subsequent increased demand for insurance coverage. This paper investigates the impact of the 1995 Hanshin-Awaji earthquake on Japanese insurers' value. Contrary to the results for U.S. earthquakes, we find significant negative stock price reactions. Furthermore, our results demonstrate that Japanese ...
Sterilization costs and exchange rate targeting
This paper examines the movements of exchange rates and capital flows in an environment where an optimizing central bank pursuing the joint goals of inflation and output targeting engages in costly sterilization activities. Our results predict that when faced with increased sterilization costs, the central bank will choose to limit its sterilization activities allowing target variables, such as the nominal exchange rate, to adjust. ; We then test the predictions of a linearized version of the saddle-path solution to the model for a cross-country panel of developing countries. We use IV, GMM ...
The disposition of failed Japanese bank assets: lessons from the U.S. savings and loan crisis
This paper reviews the Japanese experience with put guarantees recently offered in the sale of several failed banks. These guarantees, meant to address information asymmetry problems, are shown to create moral hazard problems of their own. In particular, the guarantees make acquiring banks reluctant to accept first-best renegotiations with problem borrowers. These issues also arose in the U.S. Savings and Loan crisis. Regulators in that crisis turned to an alternative guarantee mechanism known as loss-sharing arrangements, with apparently positive results. I introduce a formal debt model to ...
Pegging and macroeconomic performance in East Asia
Financial intermediation, agency, and collateral and the dynamics of banking crises: theory and evidence for the Japanese banking crisis
We outline a model of an endogenously evolving banking crisis in a growing economy subject to either idiosyncratic or aggregate productivity shocks. The model incorporates agency problems at two levels: between firms and their banks and between banks and the banks' depositors and deposit insurers. In equilibrium, banks have an incentive to renegotiate loans to insolvent firms, leading to an increasing contingent liability of the government with deposit insurance and regulatory forbearance. The growth rate of output is endogenous, and we explain how the agency problems affect the qualitative ...