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Bank:Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 

Working Paper
An empirical examination of the price-dividend relation with dividend management
Some recent empirical evidence suggests that stock prices are not properly modelled as the present discounted value of expected dividends. In this paper we estimate a present value model of stock price that is capable of explaining the observed long-term trends in stock prices. The model recognizes that firm managers control cash dividend payments. The model estimates indicate that stock price movements may be explained by managerial behavior.
AUTHORS: Ackert, Lucy F.; Hunter, William C.
DATE: 2000

Working Paper
CEO overconfidence and dividend policy
We develop a model of the effect of CEO overconfidence on dividend policy and empirically examine many of its predictions. Consistent with our main prediction, we find that the level of dividend payout is lower in firms managed by overconfident CEOs. We document that this reduction in dividends associated with CEO overconfidence is greater in firms with lower growth opportunities, lower cash flow, and greater information asymmetry. We also show that the magnitude of the positive market reaction to a dividend-increase announcement is lower for firms managed by overconfident CEOs. Our overall results are consistent with the predictions of our model.
AUTHORS: Deshmukh, Sanjay; Goel, Anand M.; Howe, Keith M.
DATE: 2009

Working Paper
Finance as a barrier to entry: bank competition and industry structure in local U.S. markets
This paper tests how competition in local U.S. banking markets affects the market structure of non- financial sectors. Theory offers competing hypotheses about how competition ought to influence firm entry and access to bank credit by mature firms. Using data on U.S. local markets for banking and non-financial sectors, we find that more vigorous banking competition ? that is, lower concentration and looser restrictions on geographical expansion -- is associated with more firms in operation and with a smaller average firm size. In fact, the whole firm-size distribution shifts toward the origin as our measures of banking competition increase. Because we exploit data at the industry level, we are able to control for alternative (omitted) variables that may drive market structure both within and outside banking by exploiting differential reliance on bank finance across industrial sectors.
AUTHORS: Strahan, Philip E.; Cetorelli, Nicola
DATE: 2004

Working Paper
Banking market conditions and deposit interest rates
This paper addresses the impact market conditions on bank deposit interest rates. Examining data for 1988-2000, we find that rates are affected by market size structure (defined as the distribution of market shares of banks of different sizes whether or not the market share is achieved entirely in that local market). This is in addition to the effects of market concentration noted in earlier work. We also find large differences between urban and rural markets. In rural areas, changes in market concentration have no effect on deposit rates. These findings have implications for antitrust policy in banking.
AUTHORS: Rosen, Richard J.
DATE: 2003

Working Paper
Nominal debt as a burden on monetary policy
We study the effects of nominal debt on the optimal sequential choice of monetary and debt policy. When the stock of debt is nominal, the incentive to generate unanticipated inflation increases the cost of the outstanding debt even if no unanticipated inflation episodes occur in equilibrium. Without full commitment, the optimal sequential policy is to deplete the outstanding stock of debt progressively until these extra costs disappear. Nominal debt is therefore a burden on monetary policy, not only because it must be serviced, but also because it creates a time inconsistency problem that distorts interest rates. The introduction of alternative forms of taxation may lessen this burden, if there is enough commitment to fiscal policy.
AUTHORS: Giovannetti, Giorgia; Marimon, Ramon; Teles, Pedro; Diaz-Gimenez, Javier
DATE: 2004

Working Paper
Inflation Uncertainty and Disagreement in Bond Risk Premia
This paper examines the relation between variations in perceived inflation uncertainty and bond premia. Using the subjective probability distributions available in the Survey of Professional Forecasters we construct a quarterly time series of average individual uncertainty about inflation forecasts since 1968. We show that this ex-ante measure of inflation uncertainty differs importantly from measures of disagreement regarding inflation forecasts and other proxies, such as model-based ex-post measures of macroeconomic risk. Inflation uncertainty is an important driver of bond premia, but the relation varies across inflation regimes. It is most important in the high-inflation regime early in the sample and the low-inflation regime over the last 15 years. Once the role of inflation uncertainty is accounted for, disagreement regarding inflation forecasts appears a much less important driver of bond premia.
AUTHORS: D'Amico, Stefania; Orphanides, Athanasios
DATE: 2014-01-11

Working Paper
More on Middlemen: Equilibrium Entry and Efficiency in Intermediated Markets
This paper generalizes Rubinstein and Wolinsky?s model of middlemen (intermediation) by incorporating production and search costs, plus more general matching and bargaining. This allows us to study many new issues, including entry, efficiency and dynamics. In the benchmark model, equilibrium exists uniquely, and involves production and intermediation for some parameters but not others. Sometimes intermediation is essential: the market operates iff middlemen are active. If bargaining powers are set correctly equilibrium is efficient; if not there can be too much or too little economic activity. This is novel, compared to the original Rubinstein-Wolinsky model, where equilibrium is always efficient.
AUTHORS: Nosal, Ed; Wright, Randall; Wong, Yuet-Yee
DATE: 2014-11-01

Working Paper
Size-dependent regulations, firm size distribution, and reallocation
In France, firms with 50 employees or more face substantially more regulation than firms with less than 50. As a result, the size distribution of firms is visibly distorted: there are many firms with exactly 49 employees. We model the regulation as the combination of a sunk cost that must be paid the first time the firm reaches 50 employees, and a payroll tax that is paid each period thereafter when the firm operates with more than 50 employees. We estimate the model using indirect inference by fitting the discontinuity of the size distribution. The key finding is that the regulation is equivalent to a combination of a sunk cost approximately equal to about one year of an average employee salary, and a small payroll tax of 0.04%. Our structural model fits well the discontinuity in the size distribution. Removing the regulation improves labor allocation across firms, leading in steady-state to an increase in output per worker slightly less than 0.3%, holding the number of firms fixed. However, if firm entry is elastic, the steady-state gains are an order of magnitude smaller.
AUTHORS: Gourio, Francois; Roys, Nicolas
DATE: 2013

Working Paper
Properties of the vacancy statistic in the discrete circle covering problem
Holst (1985) introduced a discrete spacings model that is related to the Bose-Einstein distribution and obtained the distribution of the number of vacant slots in an associated circle covering problem. We correct his expression for its probability mass function, obtain the first two moments, and describe their limiting properties. We also discuss an application of our results to a study of contagion in banking networks.
AUTHORS: Nagaraja, H. N.; Barlevy, Gadi
DATE: 2013

Working Paper
Bank time deposit rates and market discipline in Poland: the impact of state ownership and deposit insurance reform
This paper examines the impact of ownership structure and changes in the deposit insurance system on the market for bank time deposits in Poland. In an environment of less restrictive bank supervision and a deposit insurance policy that favored state banks, we find depositors exacted a price for risk taking. After a new law increasing coverage for private banks went into effect, however, bank specific variables became less important in explaining differences in deposit interest rates. We report that the three fully guaranteed state banks pay significantly lower rates that private banks. However, other state-owned banks, with the same de jure guarantee as private banks, pay significantly lower rates than private banks, so it appears that depositors treat these state-owned banks as if they have a larger de facto guarantee.
AUTHORS: Mondschean, Thomas H.; Opiela, Timothy P.
DATE: 1998

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Testa, William A. 88 items

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