Showing results 1 to 7 of approximately 7.(refine search)
Loan Sales and Bank Liquidity Risk Management: Evidence from a U.S. Credit Register
We examine the impact of banks' liquidity risk management on secondary loan sales. We track the dynamics of bank loan share ownership in the secondary market using data from the Shared National Credit Program, a credit register of syndicated bank loans administered by U.S. regulators. We analyze the 2007-2009 financial crisis as a market-wide liquidity shock and control for loan demand using a loan-year fixed effects approach. We find that banks with greater reliance on wholesale funding at the onset of the crisis were more likely to exit loan syndicates during the crisis. Our analysis ...
Stability of funding models: an analytical framework
With the recent financial crisis, many financial intermediaries experienced strains created by declining asset values and a loss of funding sources. In reviewing these stress events, one notices that some arrangements appear to have been more stable?that is, better able to withstand shocks to their asset values and/or funding sources?than others. Because the precise determinants of this stability are not well understood, gaining a better grasp of them is a critical task for market participants and policymakers as they try to design more resilient arrangements and improve financial regulation. ...
Why Did U.S. Branches of Foreign Banks Borrow at the Discount Window during the Crisis?
To help contain the economic damage caused by the recent financial crisis, the Federal Reserve extended large amounts of liquidity to financial firms through traditional lending facilities such as the discount window as well as through newly designed facilities. Recently released Federal Reserve data on discount window borrowing show that some U.S. branches and agencies of foreign banks were among the most active users of the window. In this post, we explain why U.S. branches borrow at the discount window. We also discuss two main reasons why these branches had a large need for dollars during ...
What Makes a Bank Stable? A Framework for Analysis
One of the major roles of banks and other financial intermediaries is to channel funds from savings into valuable projects. In doing so, banks engage in ?liquidity and maturity transformation,? since they finance long-term, illiquid projects while funding themselves with short-term, liquid liabilities. By performing this important role, banks expose themselves to the risk of runs: If depositors or other short-term creditors worry about their claims, they may withdraw funds en masse and cause the bank to fail. The recent financial crisis once again highlighted the fragility associated with ...
At the N.Y. Fed: Workshop on the Risks of Wholesale Funding
The Federal Reserve Banks of Boston and New York recently cosponsored a workshop on the risks of wholesale funding. Wholesale funding refers to firm financing via deposits and other liabilities from pension funds, money market mutual funds, and other financial intermediaries. Compared with stable retail funding, the supply of wholesale funding is volatile, especially during financial crises. For instance, when a firm relies on short-term wholesale funds to support long-term illiquid assets, it becomes vulnerable to runs by its wholesale creditors, as seen during the recent financial crisis. ...
Volatile Lending and Bank Wholesale Funding
The paper presents the first empirical study of the relation between bank loan volume volatility and bank retail and wholesale liabilities. We argue that since the volume of retail deposits is inflexible, banks facing volatile loan demand tend to fund loans with larger shares of wholesale rather than retail liabilities. We empirically confirm this argument using a unique dataset constructed from the weekly financial reports of 104 large U.S. commercial banks. The high frequency of the data allows us to employ dynamic identification schemes which mitigate reverse causality and selection ...
Repo runs: evidence from the tri-party repo market
The repo market has been viewed as a potential source of financial instability since the 2007-09 financial crisis, owing in part to findings that margins increased sharply in a segment of this market. This paper provides evidence suggesting that no system-wide run on repo occurred. Using confidential data on tri-party repo, a major segment of this market, we show that the level of margins and the amount of funding were surprisingly stable for most borrowers during the crisis. However, we also document a sharp decline in the tri-party repo funding of Lehman in September 2008.