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Keywords:risk preferences 

Working Paper
Corporate Governance and Risk Management at Unprotected Banks: National Banks in the 1890s

Managers' incentives may conflict with those of shareholders or creditors, particularly at leveraged, opaque banks. Bankers may abuse their control rights to give themselves excessive salaries, favored access to credit, or to take excessive risks that benefit themselves at the expense of depositors. Banks must design contracting and governance structures that sufficiently resolve agency problems so that they can attract funding from outside shareholders and depositors. We examine banks from the 1890s, a period when there were no distortions from deposit insurance or government interventions ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2014-08

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