Showing results 1 to 4 of approximately 4.(refine search)
The fragility of short-term secured funding markets
This paper develops a model of financial institutions that borrow short term and invest in long-term assets that can be traded in frictionless markets. Because these financial intermediaries perform maturity transformation, they are subject to potential runs. We derive distinct liquidity, collateral, and asset liquidation constraints, which determine whether a run can occur as a result of changing market expectations. We show that the extent to which borrowers can ward off an individual run depends on whether it has sufficient liquidity, collateral, and asset liquidation capacity. These ...
Modelling Overnight RRP Participation
We examine how market participants have used the Federal Reserve?s overnight reverse repurchase (ON RRP) exercise and how short-term interest rates have evolved between December 2013 and November 2014. We show that money market fund (MMF) participation is sensitive to the spread between market repo rates and the ON RRP offering rate as well as Treasury bill issuance, government sponsored enterprise (GSE) participation is more heavily driven by calendar effects, dealers tend to only participate when rate spreads are negative, and banks generally do not participate. We also find that the effect ...
The recent financial crisis has shown that short-term collateralized borrowing may be highly unstable in times of stress. The present paper develops a dynamic equilibrium model and shows that this instability can be a consequence of market-wide changes in expectations, but does not have to be. We derive a liquidity constraint and a collateral constraint that determine whether such expectations-driven runs are possible and show that they depend crucially on the microstructure of particular funding markets that we examine in detail. In particular, our model provides insights into the ...
Repurchase agreements as an instrument of monetary policy at the time of the Accord
Following the Treasury?Federal Reserve Accord of March 3, 1951, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) focused on free reserves?the difference between excess reserves (reserve deposits in excess of reserve requirements) and borrowed reserves?as the touchstone of U.S. monetary policy. However, managing free reserves was problematic because highly variable and not readily predictable autonomous factors, including float, Treasury balances at Federal Reserve Banks, and currency in the hands of the public, induced comparable volatility and unpredictability in reserve deposits and hence in free ...