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What is the Value of Being a Superhost?
We construct a search model where sellers post prices and produce goods of unknown quality. A match reveals the quality of the seller. Buyers rate sellers based on quality. We show that unrated sellers charge a low price to attract buyers and that highly rated sellers post a high price and sell with a higher probability than unrated sellers. We fi nd that welfare is higher with a ratings system. Using data on Airbnb rentals, we show that Superhosts and hosts with high ratings: 1) charge higher prices, 2) have a higher occupancy rate and 3) higher revenue than average hosts.
The Effects of Bank Charter Switching on Supervisory Ratings
I study whether commercial banks can improve their supervisory ratings by switching charters. I use the fees charged by chartering authorities to establish a causal effect from switching on ratings. Banks receive more favorable ratings after they change charters, an effect that is large for both national and state charters. In addition, controlling for bank ratings, banks that switch charters fail more often than others. These results suggest that banks can arbitrage ratings by switching charters and are consistent with regulators competing for banks by rating incoming banks better than ...
Credit Ratings, Private Information, and Bank Monitoring Ability
In this paper, we use credit rating data from two large Swedish banks to elicit evidence on banks' loan monitoring ability. For these banks, our tests reveal that banks' internal credit ratings indeed include valuable private information from monitoring, as theory suggests. Banks' private information increases with the size of loans.