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Conference Paper
The opening of new markets for bank assets
Working Paper
Loan sales: Pacific Rim trade in nontradable assets
An examination of the role of foreign banks in the loan sales market, finding that the motives for loan sales and purchases differ between U.S. and foreign-owned banks and between foreign banks of different regions, which is consistent with foreign banks' using the market for diversification.
Report
The Myth of the Lead Arranger’s Share
We make use of Shared National Credit Program (SNC) data to examine syndicated loans in which the lead arranger retains no stake. We find that the lead arranger sells its entire loan share for 27 percent of term loans and 48 percent of Term B loans, typically shortly after syndication. In contrast to existing asymmetric information theories on the role of the lead share, we find that loans that are sold are less likely to become non-performing in the future. This result is robust to several different measures of loan performance and is reflected in subsequent secondary market prices. We ...
Working Paper
How Do Lead Banks Use Their Private Information about Loan Quality in the Syndicated Loan Market?
Little is known about how lead banks in the syndicated loan market use their private information about loan quality. We formulate and test two hypotheses, the Signaling Hypothesis and Sophisticated Syndicate Hypothesis. To measure private information, we use Shared National Credit (SNC) internal loan ratings, which we make comparable across banks using concordance tables. We find that favorable private information is associated with higher loan retention by lead banks for term loans, consistent with empirical domination of the Signaling Hypothesis, while neither hypothesis dominates for ...
Conference Paper
The paradox of loan sales
Report
Bank loan sales: a new look at the motivations for secondary market activity
Bank lending traditionally involves the extension of credit that is held by the originating bank until maturity. Loan sales allow banks to deviate from this pattern by transferring loans in part or in their entirety from their own books to those of another institution. This paper uses a new methodology to test the validity of two hypotheses regarding banks' motivations for selling and buying loans: (1) the comparative advantage hypothesis, that banks with a comparative advantage in originating loans sell and those with a comparative advantage in funding loans buy, and (2) the diversification ...