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Keywords:liquidity regulation OR Liquidity regulation OR Liquidity Regulation 

Working Paper
Bank regulation under fire sale externalities

This paper examines the optimal design of and interaction between capital and liquidity regulations in a model characterized by fire sale externalities. In the model, banks can insure against potential liquidity shocks by hoarding sufficient precautionary liquid assets. However, it is never optimal to fully insure, so realized liquidity shocks trigger an asset fire sale. Banks, not internalizing the fire sale externality, overinvest in the risky asset and underinvest in the liquid asset in the unregulated competitive equilibrium. Capital requirements can lead to less severe fire sales by ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2016-026

Working Paper
Why Do We Need Both Liquidity Regulations and a Lender of Last Resort? A Perspective from Federal Reserve Lending during the 2007-09 U.S. Financial Crisis

During the 2007-09 financial crisis, there were severe reductions in the liquidity of financial markets, runs on the shadow banking system, and destabilizing defaults and near-defaults of major financial institutions. In response, the Federal Reserve, in its role as lender of last resort (LOLR), injected extraordinary amounts of liquidity. In the aftermath, lawmakers and regulators have taken steps to reduce the likelihood that such lending would be required in the future, including the introduction of liquidity regulations. These changes were motivated in part by the argument that central ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2015-11

Discussion Paper
Liquidity Risk, Liquidity Management, and Liquidity Policies

During the 2007-09 financial crisis, banks experienced widespread funding shortages, with shortfalls even hindering adequately capitalized banks. The Federal Reserve responded to the funding shortages by creating liquidity backstops to insulate the real economy from the banking sector?s liquidity crisis. The regulatory reforms initiated by the Dodd-Frank Act and Basel III introduced systematic liquidity risk management into bank regulations. In the past year, research economists from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York have undertaken a number of research projects to further the conceptual ...
Liberty Street Economics , Paper 20140414b

Working Paper
The costs and benefits of liquidity regulations: Lessons from an idle monetary policy tool

We investigate how liquidity regulations affect banks by examining a dormant monetary policy tool that functions as a liquidity regulation. Our identification strategy uses a regression kink design that relies on the variation in a marginal high-quality liquid asset (HQLA) requirement around an exogenous threshold. We show that mandated increases in HQLA cause banks to reduce credit supply. Liquidity requirements also depress banks' profitability, though some of the regulatory costs are passed on to liability holders. We document a prudential benefit of liquidity requirements by showing that ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2019-041

Working Paper
Investor Demands for Safety, Bank Capital, and Liquidity Measurement

We construct a model of a bank's optimal funding choice, where the bank negotiates with both safety-driven short-term bondholders and (mostly) risk-taking long-term bondholders. We establish that investor demands for safety create a negative relationship between the bank's capital choices and short-term funding, as well as negative relationships between capital and common measures of bank liquidity. Consistent with our model, our bank-level empirical analysis of these capital-liquidity tradeoffs show (1) that bank liquidity measures have a strong and negative relationship to its capital ratio ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2020-079

Report
Liquidity policies and systemic risk

The growth of wholesale-funded credit intermediation has motivated liquidity regulations. We analyze a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model in which liquidity and capital regulations interact with the supply of risk-free assets. In the model, the endogenously time-varying tightness of liquidity and capital constraints generates intermediaries? leverage cycle, influencing the pricing of risk and the level of risk in the economy. Our analysis focuses on liquidity policies? implications for household welfare. Within the context of our model, liquidity requirements are preferable to ...
Staff Reports , Paper 661

Report
Interbank market and central bank policy

We develop a model in which financial intermediaries hold liquidity to protect themselves from shocks. Depending on parameter values, banks may choose to hold too much or too little liquidity on aggregate compared with the socially optimal amount. The model endogenously generates a situation of cash hoarding, leading to the associated market freezes or underinsurance against liquidity choice. The model therefore provides a unified framework for thinking, on the one hand, about policy measures that can reduce hoarding of cash by banks and, on the other hand, about liquidity requirements of the ...
Staff Reports , Paper 763

Discussion Paper
How Liquidity Standards Can Improve Lending of Last Resort Policies

Prior to the Great Recession, the focus of bank regulation was on bank capital with little consensus about the need for liquidity regulation. This view was in contrast with an existing body of academic research that pointed to inefficiencies in environments with strictly private provision of liquidity, via either interbank markets or credit line agreements. In spite of theoretical results pointing to the possible benefits of liquidity regulation for reducing fire sales in crises or the risk of panics due to coordination failures, a common view was that its costs might exceed its benefits, ...
Liberty Street Economics , Paper 20140418

Report
The effect of monetary policy on bank wholesale funding

We study how monetary policy affects the funding composition of the banking sector. When monetary tightening reduces the retail deposit supply, banks try to substitute the deposit outflows with wholesale funding to smooth their lending. Banks have varying degrees of accessibility to wholesale funding owing to financial frictions, hence large banks, or those with a greater reliance on wholesale funding, increase their wholesale funding more. Consequently, monetary tightening increases both the reliance on and the concentration of wholesale funding within the banking sector. Our findings also ...
Staff Reports , Paper 759

Discussion Paper
Liquidity Policies and Systemic Risk

One of the most innovative and potentially far-reaching consequences of regulatory reform since the financial crisis has been the development of liquidity regulations for the banking system. While bank regulation traditionally focuses on requiring a minimum amount of capital, liquidity requirements impose a minimum amount of liquid assets. In this post, we provide a conceptual framework that allows us to evaluate the impact of liquidity requirements on economic growth, the creation of systemic risk, and household welfare. Importantly, the framework addresses both liquidity requirements and ...
Liberty Street Economics , Paper 20140417

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