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Discussion Paper
Bank Supervisory Goals versus Monetary Policy Implementation
The global financial crisis of 2007–09 revealed substantial weaknesses in large banks' capital adequacy and liquidity. Bank regulators responded with a variety of prudential measures intended to strengthen both. However, these prudential measures resulted in conflicts with the implementation of monetary policy that helped alter the way the Federal Reserve conducts monetary policy. I review three such conflicts: regulation inhibiting interest on excess reserves arbitrage starting in 2008, regulation inhibiting banks' operations in the repo market in 2019, and regulation inhibiting their ...
Report
The mechanics of a graceful exit: interest on reserves and segmentation in the federal funds market
To combat the financial crisis that intensified in the fall of 2008, the Federal Reserve injected a substantial amount of liquidity into the banking system. The resulting increase in reserve balances exerted downward price pressure in the federal funds market, and the effective federal funds rate began to deviate from the target rate set by the Federal Open Market Committee. In response, the Federal Reserve revised its operational framework for implementing monetary policy and began to pay interest on reserve balances in an attempt to provide a floor for the federal funds rate. Nevertheless, ...
Report
Managing Monetary Policy Normalization
We propose a new framework for monetary policy analysis to study monetary policy normalization when exiting a liquidity trap. The optimal combination of reserves and interest rate policy requires an increase in liquidity (reserves) a few quarters after the policy rate is set at the effective lower bound. Removal of accommodation requires that quantitative tightening starts before the liftoff of the policy rate. Moreover, the withdrawal of liquidity takes place at a very slow pace relative to the normalization of the policy rate.
Report
Floor systems and the Friedman rule: the fiscal arithmetic of open market operations
In a floor system of monetary policy implementation, the central bank remunerates bank reserves at or near the market rate of interest. Some observers have expressed concern that operating such a system will have adverse fiscal consequences for the public sector and may even require the government to subsidize the central bank. We show that this is not the case. Using the monetary general equilibrium model of Berentsen et al. (2014), we show how a central bank that supplies reserves through open market operations can always generate non-negative net income, even when using a floor system to ...
Speech
Implementing monetary policy post-crisis: What have we learned? What do we need to know? remarks at a workshop organized by Columbia University SIPA and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, May 2016
Workshop organized by Columbia University School of International Affairs and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, May 2016.
Journal Article
Money Supply
Jargon Alert on the Money Supply
Discussion Paper
Bank Supervisory Goals versus Monetary Policy Implementation
The global financial crisis of 2007–09 revealed substantial weaknesses in large banks' capital adequacy and liquidity. Bank regulators responded with a variety of prudential measures intended to strengthen both. However, these prudential measures resulted in conflicts with the implementation of monetary policy that helped alter the way the Federal Reserve conducts monetary policy. I review three such conflicts: regulation inhibiting interest on excess reserves arbitrage starting in 2008, regulation inhibiting banks' operations in the repo market in 2019, and regulation inhibiting their ...
Report
Managing Monetary Policy Normalization
We propose a new framework for monetary policy analysis to study monetary policy normalization when exiting a liquidity trap. The optimal combination of reserves and interest rate policy requires an increase in liquidity (reserves) a few quarters after the policy rate is set at the effective lower bound. Removal of accommodation requires that quantitative tightening starts before the liftoff of the policy rate. Moreover, the withdrawal of liquidity takes place at a very slow pace relative to the normalization of the policy rate.
Discussion Paper
Why Pay Interest on Excess Reserve Balances?
In a previous post, we described some reasons why it is beneficial to pay interest on required reserve balances. Here we turn to arguments in favor of paying interest on excess reserve balances. Former Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke and former Vice Chairman Donald Kohn recently discussed many potential benefits of paying interest on excess reserve balances and some common misunderstandings, including that paying interest on reserves restricts bank lending and provides a subsidy to banks. In this post, we focus primarily on benefits related to the efficiency of the payment system and ...