Showing results 1 to 10 of approximately 36.(refine search)
Uncertain booms and fragility
I develop a framework of the buildup and outbreak of financial crises in an asymmetric information setting. In equilibrium, two distinct economic states arise endogenously: ?normal times,? periods of modest investment, and ?booms,? periods of expansionary investment. Normal times occur when the intermediary sector realizes moderate investment opportunities. Booms occur when the intermediary sector realizes many investment opportunities, but also occur when it realizes very few opportunities. As a result, investors face greater uncertainty in booms. During a boom, subsequent arrival of ...
Did life insurers benefit from TARP or regulatory forbearance during the financial crisis of 2008–2009?
Life insurers? odds of being placed under regulatory control (for example, conservatorship or receivership) during the financial crisis years of 2008 and 2009 increased with deteriorating fundamentals at a much higher rate than during normal times or during the previous recession. However, no life insurer in the sample belonging to a life insurance holding company system (LIHCS) in receipt of TARP funds experienced such insolvency issues, and life insurers with poor and deteriorating performance that belonged to a LIHCS in receipt of TARP funds received increased capital inflows during the ...
Fiscal Multipliers and Financial Crises
I study the effects of the US fiscal policy response to the Great Recession, accounting both for standard tools and financial sector interventions. A nonlinear model calibrated to the US allows me to study the state-dependent effects of different fiscal policies. I combine the model with data on the fiscal policy response to find that the fall in consumption would have been one-third larger in the absence of that response, for a cumulative loss of 7.18%. Transfers and bank recapitalizations yielded the largest fiscal multipliers through new transmission channels that arise from linkages ...
Sovereigns versus Banks: Credit, Crises, and Consequences
Two separate narratives have emerged in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis. One speaks of private financial excess and the key role of the banking system in leveraging and deleveraging the economy. The other emphasizes the public sector balance sheet over the private and worries about the risks of lax fiscal policies. However, the two may interact in important and understudied ways. This paper studies the co-evolution of public and private sector debt in advanced countries since 1870. We find that in advanced economies financial stability risks have come from private sector credit booms ...
A Model of Slow Recoveries from Financial Crises
This paper documents highly persistent effects of financial crises on output, labor productivity and employment in a sample of emerging economies. To address these facts, it introduces a quantitative macroeconomic model that includes endogenous TFP growth through firm creation. Firm creators obtain funding from a financial intermediation sector which is subject to frictions. These frictions become especially severe in a financial crisis, increasing the cost of credit for firm creators and thereby lowering the growth rate of aggregate TFP. As a consequence, the model produces medium-run ...
International financial integration, crises, and monetary policy: evidence from the euro area interbank crises
We analyze how financial crises affect international financial integration, exploiting euro area proprietary interbank data, crisis and monetary policy shocks, and variation in loan terms to the same borrower on the same day by domestic versus foreign lenders. Crisis shocks reduce the supply of crossborder liquidity, with stronger volume effects than pricing effects, thereby impairing international financial integration. On the extensive margin, there is flight to home ? but this is independent of quality. On the intensive margin, however, GIPS-headquartered debtor banks suffer in the Lehman ...
Who Can Tell Which Banks Will Fail?
We use the German Crisis of 1931, a key event of the Great Depression, to study how depositors behave during a bank run in the absence of deposit insurance. We find that deposits decline by around 20 percent during the run and that there is an equal outflow of retail and nonfinancial wholesale deposits from both ex-post failing and surviving banks. This implies that regular depositors are unable to identify failing banks. In contrast, the interbank market precisely identifies which banks will fail: the interbank market collapses for failing banks entirely but continues to function for ...
The Great Mortgaging: Housing Finance, Crises, and Business Cycles
This paper unveils a new resource for macroeconomic research: a long-run dataset covering disaggregated bank credit for 17 advanced economies since 1870. The new data show that the share of mortgages on banks? balance sheets doubled in the course of the 20th century, driven by a sharp rise of mortgage lending to households. Household debt to asset ratios have risen substantially in many countries. Financial stability risks have been increasingly linked to real estate lending booms which are typically followed by deeper recessions and slower recoveries. Housing finance has come to play a ...
Managing Capital Flows in the Presence of External Risks
We introduce external risks, in the form of shocks to the level and volatility of world interest rates, into a small open economy model subject to the risk of sudden stops?large recessions together with abrupt reversals in capital inflows| and characterize optimal macroprudential policy in response to these shocks. In the model, collateral constraints create a pecuniary externality that leads to "overborrowing" and sudden stops that arise when the constraints bind. The typical sudden stop generated by the model replicates existing empirical evidence for emerging market economies: Low and ...
Historical Patterns around Financial Crises
Long-run historical data for advanced economies provide evidence to help policymakers understand specific conditions that typically lead up to financial crises. Recent research finds that rapid growth in the top income share and prolonged low labor productivity growth are robust predictors of crises. Moreover, if crises are preceded by these developments, then the subsequent recoveries are slower. This recent empirical evidence suggests that financial crises are not simply random events but are typically preceded by a prolonged buildup of macrofinancial imbalances.