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Keywords:credit agreements 

Working Paper
Concentration of Control Rights in Leveraged Loan Syndicates

Corporate loan contracts frequently concentrate control rights with a subset of lenders. In a large fraction of leveraged loans, which typically include a revolving line of credit and a term loan, the revolving lenders have the exclusive right and ability to monitor and renegotiate the financial covenants in the governing credit agreements. Concentration is more common in loans that include nonbank institutional lenders and in loans originated subsequent to the financial crisis, when recognition of bargaining frictions increased. We conclude that concentrated control rights maintain the ...
Working Papers , Paper 17-22

Working Paper
Concentration of Control Rights in Leveraged Loan Syndicates

We ?nd that corporate loan contracts frequently concentrate control rights with a subset of lenders. Despite the rise in term loans without ?nancial covenants?so-called covenant-lite loans?borrowing ?rms? revolving lines of credit almost always retain traditional ?nancial covenants. This split structure gives revolving lenders the exclusive right and ability to monitor and to renegotiate the ?nancial covenants, and we con?rm that loans with split control rights are still subject to the discipline of ?nancial covenants. We provide evidence that split control rights are designed to mitigate ...
Working Papers , Paper 19-41

Working Paper
EBITDA Add-backs in Debt Contracting: A Step Too Far?

Financial covenants in syndicated loan agreements often rely on definitions of EBITDA that deviate from the GAAP definition. We document the increased usage of non-GAAP addbacks toEBITDA in recent times. Using the 2013 Interagency Guidance on Leveraged Lending, which we argue led to an exogenous increase in non-GAAP EBITDA addbacks, we show that these addbacksincrease the likelihood of loan delinquency and default, and also increase the likelihood of the borrower experiencing a ratings downgrade. Greater use of non-GAAP EBITDA addbacks also makes it more likely that lead arrangers lower their ...
Working Papers , Paper 2022-029

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