How Our Region Differs
The banking industry has undergone a sea change in the last 30 years. Regulatory changes and technological advances have led to dramatic increases in the size and market share of large banks, while banks have shifted their activities notably away from commercial lending toward real estate lending. While these broad trends are true of banks in the Third District served by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, our regional banking market also differs in some interesting ways. Our small regional banks are larger and concentrate much more heavily on residential real estate lending and less on ...
Digital Banking: A Look at the Playing Field
Fintech developments have turbocharged banking services competition, leading to more offerings or specialization.
Measuring Cov-Lite Right
More business loans today lack traditional covenants governing borrowers. Does that leave banks with fewer tools to ward off default?
Fed Releases Proposal for CRA Reform, Seeks Comments
The Fed and the OCC have both issued proposals for reforming CRA regulations. How do they differ?
Choosing Stress Scenarios for Systemic Risk Through Dimension Reduction
Regulatory stress-testing is an important tool for ensuring banking system health in many countries around the world. Current methodologies ensure banks are well capitalized against the scenarios in the test, but it is unclear how resilient banks will be to other plausible scenarios. This paper proposes a new methodology for choosing scenarios that uses a measure of systemic risk with Correlation Pursuit variable selection, and Sliced Inverse Regression factor analysis, to select variables and create factors based on their ability to explain variation in the systemic risk measure. The main ...
Uncovering covered interest parity: the role of bank regulation and monetary policy
We analyze the factors underlying the recent deviations from covered interest parity. We show that these deviations can be explained by tighter post-crisis bank capital regulations that made the provision of foreign exchange swaps more costly. Moreover, the recent monetary policy and related interest rate divergence between the United States and other major foreign countries has led to a surge in demand for swapping low interest rate currencies into the U.S. dollar. Given the higher bank balance sheet costs resulting from these regulatory changes, the increased demand for U.S. dollars in the ...
Bank Liquidity Provision across the Firm Size Distribution
Using loan-level data covering two-thirds of all corporate loans from U.S. banks, we document that SMEs (i) obtain much shorter maturity credit lines than large ﬁrms; (ii) have less active maturity management and therefore frequently have expiring credit; (iii) post more collateral on both credit lines and term loans; (iv) have higher utilization rates in normal times; and (v) pay higher spreads, even conditional on other ﬁrm characteristics. We present a theory of loan terms that rationalizes these facts as the equilibrium outcome of a trade-off between commitment and discretion. We test ...
Banking Supervision: The Perspective from Economics
Economists have extensively analyzed the regulation of banks and the banking industry, but have devoted considerably less attention to bank supervision as a distinct activity. Indeed, much of the banking literature has used the terms “supervision” and “regulation” interchangeably. This paper provides a heuristic review of the economics literature on microprudential bank supervision, highlighting broad findings and existing gaps, especially those related to work on supervision’s theoretical underpinnings. The theoretical literature examining the motivation for supervision (monitoring ...
Welcoming Remarks, Bank Structure Conference
Remarks by Michael H. Moskow President and Chief Executive Officer Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. The Westin Hotel - 909 North Michigan Avenue, Chicago, Illinois 60611 - May 17, 2007.
Design of contingent capital with a stock price trigger for mandatory conversion
Contingent capital (CC), a regulatory debt that must convert into common equity when a bank?s equity value falls below a specified threshold (a trigger), does not in general lead to a unique equilibrium in the prices of the bank?s equity and CC. Multiplicity or absence of equilibrium arises because economic agents are not allowed to choose a conversion policy in their best interests. The lack of unique equilibrium introduces the potential for price manipulation, market uncertainty, inefficient capital allocation, and unreliability of conversion. Because CC may not convert to equity in a ...