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Keywords:agency costs 

Working Paper
Targeting Long Rates in a Model with Segmented Markets

This paper develops a model of segmented financial markets in which the net worth of financial institutions limits the degree of arbitrage across the term structure. The model is embedded into the canonical Dynamic New Keynesian (DNK) framework. We estimate the model using data on the term premium. Our principal results include the following. First, the estimated segmentation coefficient implies a nontrivial effect of central bank asset purchases on yields and real activity. Second, there are welfare gains to having the central bank respond to the term premium, eg., including the term premium ...
Working Papers (Old Series) , Paper 1419

Working Paper
Optimal Contracts, Aggregate Risk, and the Financial Accelerator

This paper derives the optimal lending contract in the financial accelerator model of Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), hereafter BGG. The optimal contract includes indexation to the aggregate return on capital, household consumption, and the return to internal funds. This triple indexation results in a dampening of fluctuations in leverage and the risk premium. Hence, compared with the contract originally imposed by BGG, the privately optimal contract implies essentially no financial accelerator.
Working Papers (Old Series) , Paper 1420

Working Paper
Contingent Debt and Performance Pricing in an Optimal Capital Structure Model with Financial Distress and Reorganization

Building on the trade-off between agency costs and monitoring costs, we develop a dynamic theory of optimal capital structure with financial distress and reorganization. Costly monitoring eliminates the agency friction and thus the risk of inefficient liquidation. Our key assumption is that monitoring cannot be applied instantaneously. Rather, transitions between agency and monitoring are subject to search frictions. In the optimal contract, the firm seeks a monitoring opportunity whenever it is financially distressed, i.e., when the risk of liquidation is high. If a monitoring opportunity ...
Working Paper , Paper 18-17

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