The emergence of \\"regular and predictable\\" as a Treasury debt management strategy
During the 1970s, U.S. Treasury officials revised the framework within which they selected the maturities of new notes and bonds. Previously, they chose maturities on an offering-by-offering basis. By 1982, the Treasury had ceased these "tactical" sales and was selling notes and bonds on a "regular and predictable" schedule. This article describes that key change in the Treasury's debt management strategy. The author shows that in 1975, Treasury officials financed an unusually rapid expansion of the federal deficit with a flurry of tactical offerings. Because the timing and maturities ...
How do treasury dealers manage their positions?
Using data on U.S. Treasury dealer positions from 1990 to 2006, we find evidence of a significant role for dealers in the intertemporal intermediation of new Treasury security supply. Dealers regularly take into inventory a large share of Treasury issuance so that dealer positions increase during auction weeks. These inventory increases are only partially offset in adjacent weeks and are not significantly hedged with futures. Dealers seem to be compensated for the risk associated with these inventory changes by means of price appreciation in the subsequent week.
Treasury bond yields and long-run inflation expectations
This Economic Letter uses data on nominal and real Treasury yields to study the behavior of market-implied expected inflation since the beginning of 2007.
Forecasting through the rear-view mirror: data revisions and bond return predictability
Real-time macroeconomic data reflect the information available to market participants, whereas final data?containing revisions and released with a delay?overstate the information set available to them. We document that the in-sample and out-of-sample Treasury return predictability is significantly diminished when real-time as opposed to revised macroeconomic data are used. In fact, much of the predictive information in macroeconomic time series is due to the data revision and publication lag components.
TIPS scorecard: are TIPS accomplishing what they were supposed to accomplish?: can they be improved?
In September 1997, the U.S. Treasury developed the TIPS market in order to achieve three important policy objectives: (1) to provide consumers with a class of assets that allows for hedging against real interest rate risk, (2) to provide holders of nominal contracts a means of hedging against inflation risk, and (3) to provide everyone with a reliable indicator of the term structure of expected inflation. This paper evaluates progress toward the achievement of these objectives and analyzes prospective ways to better meet these objectives in the future, by, for example, extending the maturity ...
Repo market effects of the Term Securities Lending Facility
The Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) was introduced by the Federal Reserve to promote liquidity in the financing markets for Treasury and other collateral. We evaluate one aspect of the program--the extent to which it has narrowed repo spreads between Treasury collateral and less liquid collateral. We find that TSLF operations have precipitated a significant narrowing of repo spreads. More refined tests indicate the market conditions and types of operations associated with the program's effectiveness. Various additional tests, including a split-sample test, suggest that our findings ...
Buybacks in Treasury cash and debt management
This paper examines the use of buybacks in Treasury cash and debt management. We review the mechanics and results of the buyback operations conducted in 2000-01, during a time of budget surpluses, and assess the prospective use of buybacks in the absence of a surplus. Possible future applications include (i) managing the liquidity of the new-issue markets when deficits are declining (by allowing Treasury officials to postpone a decision to discontinue a series without also being compelled to shrink new-issue sizes); (ii) actively promoting the liquidity of the new-issue markets (by ...
The introduction of the TMPG fails charge for U.S. Treasury securities
The TMPG fails charge for U.S. Treasury securities provides that a buyer of Treasury securities can claim monetary compensation from the seller if the seller fails to deliver the securities on a timely basis. The charge was introduced in May 2009 and replaced an existing market convention of simply postponing?without any explicit penalty and at an unchanged invoice price?a seller?s obligation to deliver Treasury securities if the seller fails to deliver the securities on a scheduled settlement date. This article explains how a proliferation of settlement fails following the insolvency of ...
Remarks on the role of central bank interactions with financial markets
Remarks at New York University's Stern School of Business, New York City.
Managing the Federal Reserve's balance sheet
Remarks at 2010 CFA Institute Fixed Income Management Conference, Newport Beach, California.