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Distributional Incentives in an Equilibrium Model of Domestic Sovereign Default
Europe?s debt crisis resembles historical episodes of outright default on domestic public debt about which little research exists. This paper proposes a theory of domestic sovereign default based on distributional incentives affecting the welfare of risk-averse debt and non-debtholders. A utilitarian government cannot sustain debt if default is costless. If default is costly, debt with default risk is sustainable, and debt falls as the concentration of debt ownership rises. A government favoring bondholders can also sustain debt, with debt rising as ownership becomes more concentrated. These ...
The Impact of the Fed’s Response to COVID-19 So Far
Since the end of February, the assets of the Federal Reserve have grown by $3 trillion as the Fed has taken measures to alleviate the economic impact of the pandemic.