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Keywords:Political science 

Working Paper
Politics, economics and investment: explaining plant and equipment spending by U.S. direct investors in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico

Few economists or laymen would deny that political events can have an important, sometimes even overwhelming, impact on economic decisions in general, and investment decisions in particular. The first goal of this paper was to integrate a number of political and non-traditional economic variables into the standard theory of investment based on the maximization of the expected value of the firm. The second goal was to test this generalized investment theory on a particularly fertile field for gauging the interaction of political and economic factors: the plant and equipment spending of foreign ...
International Finance Discussion Papers , Paper 490

Conference Paper
Competition among financial services political action committees: theory and evidence

Proceedings , Paper 509

Working Paper
Politics and exchange rate forecasts

Standard exchange rate models perform poorly in out-of-sample forecasting when compared to the random walk model. We posit part of the poor performance of these models may be due to omission of political factors. We test this hypothesis by including political variables that capture party-specific, election-specific and candidate-specific characteristics. Surprisingly, we find our political model outperforms the random walk in out-of-sample forecasting at one to twelve month horizons for the pound/dollar, mark/dollar, pound/mark and the trade-weighted dollar, mark, and pound exchange rates.
Research Working Paper , Paper 96-02

Working Paper
Political party negotiations, income distribution, and endogenous growth

This paper examines the determination of the rate of growth in an economy in which two political parties, each representing a different social class, negotiate the magnitude and allocation of taxes. Taxes may increase growth if they finance public services but reduce growth when used to redistribute income between classes. The different social classes have different preferences about growth and redistribution. The resulting conflict is resolved through the tax negotiations between the political parties. I use the model to obtain empirical predictions and policy lessons about the relationship ...
FRB Atlanta Working Paper , Paper 95-3

Working Paper
Exclusion in all-pay auctions

A description of a procedure for increasing the seller's expected revenue in an all-pay auction, specifically in the case of lobbying, where a politician is typically assumed to award the political prize to the highest bidder.
Working Papers (Old Series) , Paper 9401

Working Paper
Partisan impacts on the economy: evidence from prediction markets and close elections

Political economists interested in discerning the effects of election outcomes on the economy have been hampered by the problem that economic outcomes also influence elections. We sidestep these problems by analyzing movements in economic indicators caused by clearly exogenous changes in expectations about the likely winner during election day. Analyzing high frequency financial fluctuations on November 2 and 3 in 2004, we find that markets anticipated higher equity prices, interest rates, and oil prices and a stronger dollar under a Bush presidency than under Kerry. A similar ...
Working Paper Series , Paper 2006-08

Journal Article
Review essay on Breaking the Vicious Circle by Stephen Breyer, 1993

Regional Review , Issue Win , Pages 26

Working Paper
On the fluctuations induced by majority voting

Working Papers , Paper 9342

Working Paper
Inequality and stability

This paper analyzes how political stability depends on economic factors. Fluctuations in groups' economic capacities and in their abilities to engage in rent-seeking or predatory behavior create periodic incentives for those groups to renege on their social obligations. A constitution remains in force so long as no party wishes to defect to the noncooperative situation, and it is reinstituted as soon as each party finds it to its advantage to revert to cooperation. Partnerships of equals are easier to sustain than are arrangements in which one party is more powerful in some economic or ...
Working Papers in Applied Economic Theory , Paper 96-08

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