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Keywords:Moral hazard 

Working Paper
Bank liability insurance schemes before 1865

Prior to the Civil War several states established bank liability insurance schemes of two basic types. One was an insurance fund, in which member banks paid into a state-run fund that would pay losses of bank creditors. The other was a mutual guarantee system, in which survivor banks were legally responsible the liabilities of any bank that became insolvent. Both schemes did well at insuring bank creditors, but neither prevented bank panics. Bank failure rates were somewhat higher for banks that were part of these schemes. The experience with these schemes shows that regulatory incentives ...
Working Papers , Paper 679

Journal Article
Bailouts

Despite the cogent criticism that "bailing out" insolvent firms creates moral hazard, bailouts often occur in the aftermath of bank runs and other financial crises. In an environment where it is economically efficient to make illiquid investments, and where investors have private information regarding their respective liquidity risks, the investment contract must satisfy an incentive constraint. Limited liability tightens this constraint under laissez faire. In principle, government bailouts of insolvent firms might undo this adverse effect of limited liability. A theoretical example is ...
Economic Quarterly , Volume 96 , Issue 1Q , Pages 11-32

Working Paper
Universal Basic Income versus Unemployment Insurance

In this paper we compare the welfare effects of unemployment insurance (UI) with an universal basic income (UBI) system in an economy with idiosyncratic shocks to employment. Both policies provide a safety net in the face of idiosyncratic shocks. While the unemployment insurance program should do a better job at protecting the unemployed, it suffers from moral hazard and substantial monitoring costs, which may threaten its usefulness. The universal basic income, which is simpler to manage and immune to moral hazard, may represent an interesting alternative in this context. We work within a ...
Working Papers , Paper 2014-47

Working Paper
Optimal Social Insurance and Rising Labor Market Risk

This paper analyzes the optimal response of the social insurance system to a rise in labor market risk. To this end, we develop a tractable macroeconomic model with risk-free physical capital, risky human capital (labor market risk) and unobservable effort choice affecting the distribution of human capital shocks (moral hazard). We show that constrained optimal allocations are simple in the sense that they can be found by solving a static social planner problem. We further show that constrained optimal allocations are the equilibrium allocations of a market economy in which the government ...
Opportunity and Inclusive Growth Institute Working Papers , Paper 18

Working Paper
The Bronx Is Burning: Urban Disinvestment Effects of the Fair Access to Insurance Requirements

We study the unintended effects of Fair Access to Insurance Requirements (FAIR) plans developed by 26 states in the 1960s to address insurance redlining in urban neighborhoods. FAIR plans’ problematic features included prohibitions on considering environmental hazards in underwriting, mandatory insurer participation that diluted underwriting incentives, and payouts exceeding market values in declining areas. Using a triple-difference design comparing pre/post-FAIR periods, neighborhoods with/without likely FAIR access, and participating/nonparticipating states, we find that FAIR ...
Working Papers , Paper 25-16

Working Paper
Employment Dynamics in a Signaling Model with Workers' Incentives

Many firms adjust employment in a "lumpy" manner -- infrequently and in large bursts. In this paper, I show that lumpy adjustments can arise from concerns about the incentives of remaining workers. Specifically, I develop a model in which a firm's productivity depends on its workers' effort and workers' income prospects depend on the firm's profitability. I use this model to analyze the consequences of demand shocks that are observed by the firm but not by its workers, who can only try to infer the firm's profitability from its employment decisions. I show that the resulting signaling model ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2017-040

Speech
Some observations about policy lessons from the crisis

Presented by Charles I. Plosser, President and Chief Executive Officer, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, The Philadelphia Fed Policy Forum: Policy Lessons from the Economic and Financial Crisis, December 4, 2009
Speech , Paper 32

Speech
Housing and the economic recovery

Remarks at the New Jersey Bankers Association Economic Forum, Iselin, New Jersey.
Speech , Paper 73

Briefing
Can orderly liquidation solve the problems of bailouts and bankruptcies?

In response to the financial crisis of 2007?09, Congress created the Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA), a new regime for winding down systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) that become troubled. The OLA provisions address two conflicting goals: mitigating threats to the financial system associated with bankruptcy and minimizing moral hazard associated with government bailouts. This Economic Brief compares OLA provisions to bankruptcy procedures. Although the OLA process could be quicker and more flexible than bankruptcy, it may not limit systemic risk without increasing moral ...
Richmond Fed Economic Brief , Issue Sep

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