Federal Reserve liquidity provision during the financial crisis of 2007-2009
This paper examines the Federal Reserve's unprecedented liquidity provision during the financial crisis of 2007-2009. It first reviews how the Fed provides liquidity in normal times. It then explains how the Fed's new and expanded liquidity facilities were intended to enable the central bank to fulfill its traditional lender-of-last-resort role during the crisis while mitigating stigma, broadening the set of institutions with access to liquidity, and increasing the flexibility with which institutions could tap such liquidity. The paper then assesses the growing empirical literature on the ...
Financial fragility and the lender of last resort
Solvency runs, sunspot runs, and international bailouts
This paper introduces a model of international lender of last resort (ILLR) activity under asymmetric information. The ILLR is unable to distinguish between runs due to debtor insolvency and those which are the result of pure sunspots. Nevertheless, the ILLR can elicit the underlying state of nature from informed creditors by offering terms consistent with generating a separating equilibrium. Achieving the separating equilibrium requires that the ILLR lends to the debtor at sufficiently high rates. This adverse electing problem provides an alternative rationale for Bagehot's Principle of ...
A model of the lender of last resort
The Fed as lender of last resort
Lessons of the past and prospects for the future in lender of last resort theory
A history of the changes in the theory of the role of the lender of last resort--as a source of solvency versus liquidity support--and a discussion of the distinction between necessity and convenience (the American and European versions of lender of last resort theory) in mounting rescue operations through the central bank.
From Bagehot to Bernanke and Draghi: emergency liquidity, macroprudential supervision and the rediscovery of the lender of last resort function
Remarks at the Committee on International Monetary Law of the International Law Association Meeting, Madrid, Spain.
Liquidity creation without a lender of last resort: clearing house loan certificates in the Banking Panic of 1907
We employ a new data set comprised of disaggregate figures on clearing house loan certificate issues in New York City to document how the dominant national banks were crucial providers of temporary liquidity during the Panic of 1907. Clearing house loan certificates were essentially ?bridge loans? arranged between clearing house members. They enabled and were issued in anticipation of gold imports, which took a few weeks to arrive. The large, New York City national banks acted as private liquidity providers by requesting (and the New York Clearing House issuing) a volume of clearing house ...
Reconciling Bagehot with the Fed's response to Sept. 11
Bagehot (1873) states that in order to prevent bank panics a central bank should provide liquidity to the market at a "very high rate of interest". This seems to be in sharp contrast with the policy adopted by the Federal Reserve after September 11 when, for a few days, the Federal Funds Rate was very close to zero. This paper shows that Bagehot's recommendation can be reconciled with the Fed's policy if one recognizes that Bagehot has in mind a commodity money regime so that the amount of reserves available is limited. A high price for this liquidity allows banks that need it most to ...
The Federal safety net for commercial banks: pt. I