Showing results 1 to 5 of approximately 5.(refine search)
Supply matters for asset prices: evidence from IPOs in emerging markets
We show that the introduction of a new asset affects the prices of previously existing assets in a market. Using data from 254 IPOs in emerging markets, we find that stocks in industries that covary highly with the industry of the IPO experience a larger decline in prices relative to other stocks during the month of the IPO. The effects are stronger when the IPO is issued in a market that is less integrated internationally, and when the IPO is big. The evidence supports the idea that the composition of asset supply affects the cross-section of stock prices.
AUTHORS: Braun, Matias; Larrain, Borja
Litigation risk, strategic disclosure and the underpricing of initial public offerings
Using word content analysis on the time-series of IPO prospectuses, we find evidence that issuers trade off underpricing and strategic disclosure as potential hedges against litigation risk. This tradeoff explains a significant fraction of the variation in prospectus revision patterns, IPO underpricing, the partial adjustment phenomenon, and litigation outcomes. We find that strong disclosure is an effective hedge against all lawsuits. Underpricing, however, is an effective hedge only against the incidence of Section 11 lawsuits, those lawsuits which are most damaging to the underwriter. Underwriters who fail to adequately hedge litigation risk experience economically large penalties including loss of market share.
AUTHORS: Hanley, Kathleen Weiss; Hoberg, Gerard
A fully-rational liquidity-based theory of IPO underpricing and underperformance
I present a fully-rational symmetric-information model of an IPO, and a dynamic imperfectly competitive model of trading in the IPO aftermarket. The model helps to explain IPO underpricing, underperformance, and why share allocations favor large institutional investors. In the model, underwriters need to sell a fixed number of shares at the IPO or in the aftermarket. To maximize revenue and avoid selling into the aftermarket where they can be exploited by large investors, underwriters distort share allocations towards investors with market power, and set the IPO offer price below the aftermarket trading price. Large investors who receive IPO share allocations sell them slowly afterwards to reduce their trade's price-impact. This curtails the shares that are available to small price-taking investors, causing them to bid up prices and bid down returns. In some simulations, the distorted share allocations and slow unwinding behavior generate post-IPO return underperformance that persists for several years.
AUTHORS: Pritsker, Matthew
Conflict of interest and certification in the U.S. IPO market
We examine the long-run performance and valuation of IPOs underwritten by relationship banks. We find that over one- to three-year horizons these IPOs do not underperform similar stocks managed by independent institutions. Moreover, our analysis suggests that relationship banks avoid potential conflicts of interest by choosing to underwrite their best clients' IPOs. Consistent with this result, we show that investors value new issues managed by relationship banks higher than similar IPOs managed by outside banks. Our findings support the certification role of relationship banks and suggest that the effect of the 1999 repeal of Sections 20 and 32 of the Glass-Steagall Act has not been negative.
AUTHORS: Benzoni, Luca; Schenone, Carola
Do underwriters matter? The impact of the near loss of an equity underwriter
The financial crisis provides a natural experiment for testing theoretical predictions of the equity underwriter's role following an initial public offering. Clients of Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, and Wachovia saw their stock prices fall almost 5 percent, on average, on the day it appeared that their equity underwriter might collapse. Representing a loss in equity value of more than $3 billion, the decline was more than 1 percent lower than the conditional return predicted by a market model. The price impact was worse for companies with more opaque operations and fewer monitors, suggesting that underwriters play an important role in monitoring newly public companies. There is no evidence that the abnormal price decrease was related to the role of the underwriter as market maker or lender.
AUTHORS: Kovner, Anna