Search Results

Showing results 1 to 10 of approximately 43.

(refine search)
SORT BY: PREVIOUS / NEXT
Keywords:Game theory 

Working Paper
Bargaining a monetary union

FRB Atlanta Working Paper , Paper 94-4

Working Paper
If at first you don't succeed: an experimental investigation of the impact of repetition options on corporate takeovers

This paper models, and experimentally simulates, the free-rider problem in a takeover when the raider has the option to ?resolicit,? that is, to make a new offer after an offer has been rejected. In theory, the option to resolicit, by lowering offer credibility, increases the dissipative losses associated with free riding. In practice, the outcomes of our experiment, while quite closely tracking theory in the effective absence of an option to resolicit, differed dramatically from theory when a significant probability of resolicitation was introduced: The option to resolicit reduced the costs ...
FRB Atlanta Working Paper , Paper 2000-9

Report
Dynamic games with hidden actions and hidden states

We consider a class of dynamic games in which each player?s actions are unobservable to the other players and each player?s actions can influence a state variable that is unobservable to the other players. We develop an algorithm that solves for the subset of sequential equilibria in which equilibrium strategies depend on private information only through the privately observed state.
Staff Report , Paper 254

Report
An experimental study of learning and limited information in games

We report on experiments that tested the predictions of competing theories of learning in games. Experimental subjects played a version of the three-person matching-pennies game. The unique mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of this game is locally unstable under naive Bayesian learning. Sophisticated Bayesian learning predicts that expectations will converge to Nash equilibrium if players observe the entire history of play. Neither theory requires payoffs to be common knowledge. We develop maximum-likelihood tests for the independence conditions implied by the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. ...
Staff Report , Paper 176

Working Paper
Financing, commitment and entry deterrence

Working Papers , Paper 87-8

Working Paper
Corporate board composition, protocols, and voting behavior: experimental evidence

We model experimentally the governance of an institution. The optimal management of this institution depends on the information possessed by insiders. However, insiders, whose interests are not aligned with the interests of the institution, may choose to use their information to further personal rather than institutional ends. Researchers (e.g., Palfrey 1990) and the business press have both argued that multiagent mechanisms, which inject trustworthy but uninformed ?watchdog? agents into the governance process and impose penalties for conflicting recommendations, can implement institutionally ...
FRB Atlanta Working Paper , Paper 2000-10

Working Paper
Dynamic games with hidden actions and hidden states

We consider the large class of dynamic games in which each player?s actions are unobservable to the other players, and each player?s actions can influence a state variable that is unobservable to the other players. We develop an algorithm that solves for the subset of sequential equilibria in which equilibrium strategies are Markov in the privately observed state.
Working Papers , Paper 583

Journal Article
Game strategy in fiscal straits: When government debts become large, lessons of game theory might help avoid a crisis

Related links: https://www.richmondfed.org/-/media/richmondfedorg/publications/research/econ_focus/2012/q4/feature4_weblinks.cfm
Econ Focus , Volume 16 , Issue 4Q , Pages 24-28

Working Paper
Finite memory and imperfect monitoring

Working Papers , Paper 604

Report
Learning from failure

We study decentralized learning in organizations. Decentralization is captured through a symmetry constraint on agents? strategies. Among such attainable strategies, we solve for optimal and equilibrium strategies. We model the organization as a repeated game with imperfectly observable actions. A fixed but unknown subset of action profiles are successes and all other action profiles are failures. The game is played until either there is a success or the time horizon is reached. For any time horizon, including infinity, we demonstrate existence of optimal attainable strategies and show that ...
Staff Report , Paper 299

FILTER BY year

FILTER BY Content Type

FILTER BY Author

Cole, Harold L. 4 items

Jamison, Julian 4 items

Kocherlakota, Narayana R. 3 items

Allen, Beth 2 items

Bech, Morten L. 2 items

Gillette, Ann B. 2 items

show more (52)

FILTER BY Keywords

PREVIOUS / NEXT