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Keywords:Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 

Journal Article
The national depositor preference law

A critical analysis of the probable effects of national depositor preference--a provision of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993--showing that although the FDIC may experience some cost savings in the short term, the long-term benefits are likely to be greatly diminished.
Economic Commentary , Issue Feb

Speech
Managing crises without government guarantees—how do we get there?

Remarks at Banking Law Symposium 2011, Paris, France.
Speech

Journal Article
Managing TBTF by reducing systemic risk

The most persuasive way to convince bank creditors that their bank isn't too big to fail (TBTF) is for policymakers to reduce systemic risk and to communicate those steps to the public.
The Region , Volume 20 , Issue Jun , Pages 18-21, 46-49

Conference Paper
Milestones and challenges in deposit insurance pricing

Proceedings , Paper 692

Working Paper
A proposal for efficiently resolving out-of-the-money swap positions at large insolvent banks

Recent evidence suggests that bank regulators appear to be able to resolve insolvent large banks efficiently without either protecting uninsured deposits through invoking "too-big-to-fail" or causing serious harm to other banks or financial markets. But resolving swap positions at insolvent banks, particularly a bank's out-of-the-money positions, has received less attention. The FDIC can now either repudiate these contracts and treat the in-the-money counterparties as at-risk general creditors or transfer the contracts to a solvent bank. Both options have major drawbacks. Terminating ...
Working Paper Series , Paper WP-03-01

Journal Article
FDIC's modified payout plan

FRBSF Economic Letter

Journal Article
Depositor discipline at failing banks

Uninsured depositors, whose deposits are not fully protected by federal deposit insurance, have an incentive to monitor banks' activities and impose additional funding costs on risky banks. This pricing is a form of market discipline, since the market penalizes banks for taking on greater risk. For banks that become troubled, market discipline can take a more severe form: Market participants may become unwilling to supply uninsured funds at any reasonable price. This study examines the effectiveness of depositor discipline at banks that failed in New England in the early 1990s. ; The ...
New England Economic Review , Issue Mar , Pages 15-28

Journal Article
Two deposit insurance funds are not necessarily better than one

With the passage of the Financial Modernization Act in 1999, the FDIC began reforming our system of federal deposit guarantees. Among the possibilities it has recently raised is a merger of its Bank Insurance Fund with its Savings Association Insurance Fund. This Economic Commentary explores that option.
Economic Commentary , Issue Oct

Conference Paper
Short and long snapshots of the U.S. banking industry

Proceedings , Paper 308

Journal Article
Deposit insurance reform - when half a loaf is better

FRBSF Economic Letter

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