Problems in applying discriminant analysis in credit scoring models
Small-business access to trade credit: some evidence of ethnic differences
Based on findings from a survey of Black Households, this paper highlights socioeconomic and demographic factors that many influence the utilization of different financial markets. In addition, it discusses the potentially important role that informal financial networks can play in racial/ethnic communities. We propose that education programs, proactive community participation and partnerships between financial institutions and community organizations are important for greater access to credit and financial services among Black Households.
Redlining or red herring?
Self-selection and discrimination in credit markets
This paper increases understanding of the causes and consequences of discrimination in credit markets. It develops an underwriting model in which lenders use a simple Bayesian updating process to evaluate applicant creditworthiness. It also models individuals' self-selection behavior to show how market frictions can affect application decisions.
Workshops spotlight women's access to credit and capital issues
Access to credit and financial services among black households
Does credit scoring produce a disparate impact?
The widespread use of credit scoring in the underwriting and pricing of mortgage and consumer credit has raised concerns that the use of these scores may unfairly disadvantage minority populations. A specific concern has been that the independent variables that comprise these models may have a disparate impact on these demographic groups. By "disparate impact" we mean that a variable's predictive power might arise not from its ability to predict future performance within any demographic group, but rather from acting as a surrogate for group membership. Using a unique source of data that ...
On the economics of discrimination in credit markets
This paper develops a general equilibrium model of both taste-based and statistical discrimination in credit markets. We find that both types of discrimination have similar predictions for intergroup differences in loan terms. The commonly held view has been that if there exists taste-based discrimination, loans approved to minority borrowers would have higher expected profitability than to majorities with comparable credit background. We show that the validity of this profitability view depends crucially on how expected loan profitability is measured. We also show that there must exist ...