Default and the maturity structure in sovereign bonds
This paper studies the maturity composition and the term structure of interest rate spreads of government debt in emerging markets. We document that in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Russia, when interest rate spreads rise, debt maturity shortens and the spread on short-term bonds is higher than on long-term bonds. To account for this pattern, we build a dynamic model of international borrowing with endogenous default and multiple maturities of debt. Short-term debt can deliver higher immediate consumption than long-term debt; large longterm loans are not available because the borrower cannot ...
Payment changes and default risk: theimpact of refinancing on expected credit losses
This paper analyzes the relationship between changes in borrowers' monthly mortgage payments and future credit performance. This relationship is important for the design of an internal refinance program such as the Home Affordable Refinance Program (HARP). We use a competing risk model to estimate the sensitivity of default risk to downward adjustments of borrowers' monthly mortgage payments for a large sample of prime adjustable-rate mortgages. Applying a 26 percent average monthly payment reduction that we estimate would result from refinancing under HARP, we find that the cumulative ...
The rise in mortgage defaults
The main factors underlying the rise in mortgage defaults appear to be declines in house prices and deteriorated underwriting standards, in particular an increase in loan-to-value ratios and in the share of mortgages with little or no documentation of income. Contrary to popular perception, the growth in unconventional mortgages products, such as those with prepayment penalties, interest-only periods, and teaser interest rates, does not appear to be a significant factor in defaults through mid-2008 because borrowers who had problems with these products could refinance into different ...
What \"triggers\" mortgage default?
This paper assesses the relative importance of two key drivers of mortgage default: negative equity and illiquidity. To do so, the authors combine loan-level mortgage data with detailed credit bureau information about the borrower's broader balance sheet. This gives them a direct way to measure illiquid borrowers: those with high credit card utilization rates. The authors find that both negative equity and illiquidity are significantly associated with mortgage default, with comparably sized marginal effects. Moreover, these two factors interact with each other: The effect of illiquidity on ...
Mortgage default and mortgage valuation
We study optimal exercise by mortgage borrowers of the option to default. Also, we use an equilibrium valuation model incorporating default to show how mortgage yields and lender recovery rates on defaulted mortgages depend on initial loan-to-value ratios when borrowers default optimally. The analysis treats both the frictionless case and the case in which borrowers and/or lenders incur deadweight costs upon default. The model is calibrated using data on California mortgages. We find that the model's principal testable implication for default and mortgage pricing?that default rates and yield ...
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York's involvement with AIG
Joint written testimony before the Congressional Oversight Panel, Washington, D.C.
Juvenile delinquent mortgages: bad credit or bad economy?
We study early default, defined as serious delinquency or foreclosure in the first year, among nonprime mortgages from the 2001 to 2007 vintages. After documenting a dramatic rise in such defaults and discussing their correlates, we examine two primary explanations: changes in underwriting standards that took place over this period and changes in the economic environment. We find that while credit standards were important in determining the probability of an early default, changes in the economy after 2004 - especially a sharp reversal in house price appreciation - were the more critical ...
How should banks account for loan losses?
The agencies that regulate banks are involved in an ongoing debate about the appropriate way for banks and other lenders to account for default risk on loans. Accounting authorities are concerned with whether the accounting method meets the needs of general-purpose users of financial statements, particularly investors. In contrast, bank supervisors are concerned about banks being inadequately capitalized and possibly failing. ; To shed light on this debate, this article reviews the generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) currently used, which are based on historic-cost values for ...
Europe may provide lessons on preventing mortgage defaults
During the last global recession, house prices fell in some European countries almost as much as in some U.S. states. However, mortgage defaults occurred at a much lower rate in Europe. The authors say the difference might be explained by two regulations that apply in Europe but are used on a limited or much less restrictive basis in the U.S.
Risky mortgages and mortgage default premiums
Mortgage lenders impose a default premium on the loans they originate to compensate for the possibility that borrowers won?t make payments. The housing boom of the 2000s was characterized by increasing riskiness of the borrowers approved for mortgages and the structures of the loans themselves. Despite these changes in risk, a pricing model can justify the spreads contained in mortgages made during this period based on what at the time seemed to be reasonable expectations for house price appreciation. Contrary to those expectations, prices fell dramatically.