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Working Paper
Deregulation and the relationship between bank CEO compensation and risk taking
Brewer, Elijah; Hunter, William C.; Jackson, William E. (2003)
The deregulation of the banking industry during the 1990s provides a natural (public policy) experiment for investigating how firms adjust their executive compensation contracts as the environment in which they operate becomes relatively more competitive. Using the Riegle-Neal Act of 1994 as a focal point, we investigate how banks changed the equity-based component of bank CEO compensation contracts. We also examine the relationships between equity- based compensation and risk, capital structure, and investment opportunity set. Consistent with theoretical predictions, we find that after ...
Working Paper Series , Paper WP-03-32

Conference Paper
Appreciating the differences : the impact of Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the banking industry
Duke, Elizabeth A. (2003)
Proceedings , Paper 869

Journal Article
Introduction: Special issue: corporate governance: what do we know and what is different about banks?
Mehran, Hamid (2003)
This special volume of the Economic Policy Review is designed to foster a better understanding of corporate governance - particularly as it applies to banking firms - among regulators, investors, researchers, and the interested public. The contributors to the volume, specialists in governance, analyze the topic from many perspectives, including law, financial accounting, and financial economics. As they summarize and synthesize a vast literature on vital governance issues, the authors present a framework for understanding corporate governance and identify key areas of future research.
Economic Policy Review , Volume 9 , Issue Apr , Pages 1-3

Newsletter
Corporate governance at community banks: a Seventh District analysis
Fried, Colette A.; Driscoll, Patrick; DeYoung, Robert (2005)
Community banks can be vulnerable to the same economic tensions and conflicts of interest that have compromised corporate governance at more high-profile firms over the past few years. The authors discuss their preliminary findings from a project designed to construct a systematic database on the corporate governance practices at District community banks.
Chicago Fed Letter , Issue Oct

Working Paper
External governance and debt agency costs of family firms
Guntay, Levent; Lel, Ugur; Ellul, Andrew (2007)
We investigate the impact of family blockholders on the firm's debt agency costs under different investor protection environments. On one hand, families--through their undiversified investments, inter-generation presence, and reputation concerns--can mitigate debt agency costs. On the other hand, families--through their unique power position that can lead to private benefits extraction and higher bankruptcy risk--can exacerbate debt agency costs. The actual impact can go either way and what matters should be the creditors' protection environment. Using international bond issues from 1995 to ...
International Finance Discussion Papers , Paper 908

Speech
Commencement address : a speech at the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, May 15, 2005
Greenspan, Alan (2005)
Speech , Paper 106

Report
Firm value and cross-listings: the impact of stock market prestige
Cetorelli, Nicola; Peristiani, Stavros (2010)
This study investigates the valuation impact of a firm?s decision to cross-list on a more (or less) prestigious stock exchange relative to its own domestic market. We use network analysis to derive broad market-based measures of prestige for forty-five country or regional stock exchange destinations between 1990 and 2006. We find that firms cross-listing in a more prestigious market enjoy significant valuation gains over the five-year period following the listing. We also document a reverse effect for firms cross-listing in less prestigious markets: These firms experience a significant ...
Staff Reports , Paper 474

Journal Article
Because I'm worth it? CEO pay and corporate governance
Huang, Rocco (2010-07)
Recently, there has been strong public outrage against current pay practices for corporate CEOs. To deal with this issue, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act signed into law by President Obama on July 21, 2010 will allow shareholders to vote on executive pay packages and federal regulators to oversee executive compensation at financial firms. Are there problems with CEO pay? According to a recent survey, 98 percent of respondents from major financial institutions ?believe that compensation structures were a factor underlying the crisis.? In ?Because I?m Worth It? CEO ...
Business Review , Issue Q3 , Pages 12-19

Working Paper
Corporate governance structure and mergers
Jagtiani, Julapa; Brewer, Elijah; Jackson, William E. (2010)
Few transactions have the potential to generate revelations about the market value of corporate assets and liabilities as mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Corporate governance and control mechanisms such as independent directors, independent blockholders, and managerial share ownership are usually important predictors of the size and distribution of the incremental wealth generated by M&A transactions. The authors add to this literature by investigating these relationships using a sample of banking organization M&A transactions over the period 1990-2004. Unlike research on nonfinancial firms, ...
Working Papers , Paper 10-26

Conference Paper
Corporate governance of bank mergers
Becher, David A.; Campbell, Terry L. (2004)
By investigating the extent to which target directors bargain in their own interests during negotiations between merging banks, we document a strong inverse relation between merger premium and target director retention. This relation holds for both executive (inside) directors and independent outside directors, and other governance mechanisms of targets and bidders fail to diminish this finding. Moreover, individual target director retention is conditioned by the relative size but not by prior target performance. Overall, our results suggest some target directors exercise their bargaining ...
Proceedings , Paper 918

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