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Keywords:Corporate governance 

Risk governance: appetite, culture and the limits of limits

Remarks at the Risk USA 2012 Conference, New York City.
Speech , Paper 91

Supervisory reform for global banks

Remarks at the Center for Transnational Legal Studies Seminar on the Impact of U.S. Regulatory Reform on Global Banks, New York City.
Speech , Paper 96

When is there a strong transfer risk from the sovereigns to the corporates? Property rights gaps and CDS spreads

When a sovereign faces the risk of debt default, it may be tempted to expropriate the private sector. This may be one reason why international investment in private companies has to take into account the sovereign risk. But the likelihood of sovereign risk transferring to corporates and increasing their risk of default may be mitigated by legal institutions that provide strong property rights protection. Using a novel credit default swaps (CDS) data set covering government and corporate entities across thirty countries, we study both the average strength of the transfer risks and the role of ...
Staff Reports , Paper 579

Corporate performance, board structure, and their determinants in the banking industry

The subprime crisis highlights how little we know about the governance of banks. This paper addresses a long-standing gap in the literature by analyzing board governance using a sample of banking firm data that spans forty years. We examine the relationship between board structure (size and composition) and bank performance, as well as some determinants of board structure. We document that mergers and acquisitions activity influences bank board composition, and we provide new evidence that organizational structure is significantly related to bank board size. We argue that these factors may ...
Staff Reports , Paper 330

Resolving troubled systemically important cross-border financial institutions: is a new corporate organizational form required?

This paper explores the advantages of a new financial charter for large, complex, internationally active financial institutions that would address the corporate governance challenges of such organizations, including incentive problems in risk decisions and the complicated corporate and regulatory structures that impede cross-border resolutions. The charter envisions a single entity with broad powers in which the extent and timing of compensation are tied to financial results, senior managers and risk takers form a new risk-bearing stakeholder class, and a home-country-based resolution regime ...
Staff Reports , Paper 457

Firm value and cross-listings: the impact of stock market prestige

This study investigates the valuation impact of a firm?s decision to cross-list on a more (or less) prestigious stock exchange relative to its own domestic market. We use network analysis to derive broad market-based measures of prestige for forty-five country or regional stock exchange destinations between 1990 and 2006. We find that firms cross-listing in a more prestigious market enjoy significant valuation gains over the five-year period following the listing. We also document a reverse effect for firms cross-listing in less prestigious markets: These firms experience a significant ...
Staff Reports , Paper 474

A new era of bank supervision

Remarks at the New York Bankers Association Financial Services Forum, New York City.
Speech , Paper 65

The implementation of recent monetary policy actions

Testimony before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives.> .
Speech , Paper 72

Corporate governance and banks: what have we learned from the financial crisis?

Recent academic work and policy analysis give insight into the governance problems exposed by the financial crisis and suggest possible solutions. We begin this paper by explaining why governance of banks differs from governance of nonfinancial firms. We then look at four areas of governance: executive compensation, boards, risk management, and market discipline. We discuss promising solutions and areas where further research is needed.
Staff Reports , Paper 502

What can we learn from privately held firms about executive compensation?

We study the Green and Lin (2003) model of financial intermediation with two new features: traders may face a cost of contacting the intermediary, and consumption needs may be correlated across traders. We show that each feature is capable of generating an equilibrium in which some (but not all) traders ?run? on the intermediary by withdrawing their funds at the first opportunity regardless of their true consumption needs. Our results also provide some insight into elements of the economic environment that are necessary for a run equilibrium to exist in general models of financial ...
Staff Reports , Paper 314


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