Showing results 1 to 9 of approximately 9.(refine search)
Cartels: breaking up ain't hard to do
Talk about a slippery slope. Keeping a cartel together is like trying to stop on ice-just when you think you've done it, it slips out from under you.
Life expectancy of international cartels: an empirical analysis
This paper examines the empirical relation between market structure and life expectancy for cartels that were active in international commodity markets throughout this century. I consider two alternative empirical formulations and estimate their parameters recognizing that durability cannot take negative values. Both formulations predict that increases in either market shares or intercartel concentration prolong life expectancy but disagree in the relative importance of these two factors. The application of tests to discriminate among the two formulations does not support constant-elasticity ...
Food for crude
OPEC and oil prices
The economic performance of cartels: evidence from the New Deal U.S. sugar manufacturing cartel, 1934-74
We study the U.S. sugar manufacturing cartel that was created during the New Deal. This was a legal-cartel that lasted 40 years (1934-74). As a legal-cartel, the industry was assured widespread adherence to domestic and import sales quotas (given it had access to government enforcement powers). But it also meant accepting government-sponsored cartel-provisions. These provisions significantly distorted production at each factory and also where the industry was located. These distortions were reflected in, for example, a declining industry recovery rate, that is, the pounds of white sugar ...
Cartels Destroy Productivity: Evidence from the New Deal Sugar Manufacturing Cartel, 1934-74
The idea that cartels might reduce industry productivity by misallocating production from high to low productivity producers is as old as Adam. However, the study of the economic consequences of cartels has almost exclusively focused on the losses from higher prices (i.e., Harberger triangles). Yet, as the old idea suggests, we show that the rules for quotas and side payments in the New Deal sugar cartel led to significant misallocation of production. The resulting productivity declines essentially destroyed the entire cartel profit. The magnitude of the deadweight losses (relative to value ...
Stable cartels with a Cournot fringe