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Keywords:Banks and banking, Central 

Conference Paper
How independent should a central bank be?

Conference Series ; [Proceedings] , Volume 38 , Pages 195-225

Journal Article
Combining bank supervision and monetary policy

In the United States, the Federal Reserve has responsibility for both monetary policy and bank supervision. Other countries separate these functions to varying degrees. What lies behind this global diversity? Should a central bank be charged with conducting monetary policy and regulating banks, or does it make more sense ? both economic and political ? to keep these activities separate? The answer is not a simple yes or no. Rather, it appears that the right choice depends on a country?s prevailing conditions, including its financial system, its political environment, and the preferences of ...
Economic Commentary , Issue Nov

Journal Article
Price stability: is a tough central bank enough?

What is the best way to achieve price stability? Conventional wisdom says that a tough, independent central bank is all that is necessary. However, a new view?the fiscal theory of the price level?argues that an appropriate fiscal policy is also required, no matter how tough the central bank may be. The choice of the fiscal theory versus the conventional view has significant implications for the way central banks do business.
Economic Commentary , Issue Aug

Journal Article
Institutions for stable prices: how to design an optimal central bank law

This article was adapted from a speech of the same title presented at the First Conference of the Monetary Stability Foundation at the Regional Office of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Frankfurt, Germany, December 5, 2002.
Review , Volume 85 , Issue Sep , Pages 1-6

Working Paper
Quantitative easing and bank lending: evidence from Japan

Prior to the recent financial crisis, one of the most prominent examples of unconventional monetary stimulus was Japan's "quantitative easing policy" (QEP). Most analysts agree that QEP did not succeed in stimulating aggregate demand sufficiently to overcome persistent deflation. However, it remains unclear whether QEP simply provided little stimulus, or whether its positive effects were overwhelmed by the contractionary forces in Japan's post-bubble economy. In the spirit of Kashyap and Stein (2000) and Hosono (2006), this paper uses bank-level data from 2000 to 2009 to examine the ...
International Finance Discussion Papers , Paper 1018

Speech
Hawks, doves, bubbles, and inflation targets

April 16, 2012. "Hawks, Doves, Bubbles, and Inflation Targets" Presented at the George S. Eccles Distinguished Lecture, Jon M. Huntsman School of Business, Utah State University.
Speech , Paper 198

Report
Looking back: a retrospective conversation with William Poole

Essay from the 2007 Annual Report. During the Poole era, three worth noting are: Monetary Policy; FOMC Communication; St. Louis Fed Leadership
Annual Report

Journal Article
Reflections of a central banker

From the early years of Sproul's presidency until the Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord of 1951, Federal Reserve policy was subordinated to the Treasury's wartime and postwar financing needs. In this 1955 speech, Sproul speaks of the resurgence of flexible monetary policy. He invites the academic economists in his audience to turn their attention to the study of central banking issues and to contribute in this way to informed monetary policy decisions. Sproul's address provides an overview of the structure, techniques, and objectives of the Federal Reserve System and gives particular attention ...
Quarterly Review , Issue Special

Journal Article
Independence + accountability: why the Fed is a well-designed central bank

In 1913, Congress purposefully created the Federal Reserve as an independent central bank, which created a fundamental tension: how to ensure the Fed remains accountable to the electorate without losing its independence. Over the years, there have been changes in the Fed?s structure to improve its independence, credibility, accountability, and transparency. These changes have led to a better institutional design that makes U.S. policy credible and based on sound economic reasoning, as opposed to politics. In times of financial and economic crisis, there is an understandable tendency to ...
Review , Volume 93 , Issue Sep , Pages 293-302

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