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Keywords:Bank notes 

Working Paper
Resolving the puzzle of the underissuance of national bank notes

The puzzle of underissuance of national bank notes disappears when one disaggregates data, takes account of regulatory limits, and considers differences in opportunity costs. Banks with poor lending opportunities maximized their issuance. Other banks chose to limit issuance. Redemption costs do not explain cross-sectional variation in issuance, and the observed relationship between note issuance and excess reserves is inconsistent with the redemption risk hypothesis of underissuance. National banks did not enter primarily to issue national bank notes, and a ?pure arbitrage? strategy of ...
Working Papers , Paper 05-19

Report
Were U.S. state banknotes priced as securities?

This study examines the pricing of U.S. state banknotes before 1860 using data on the discounts on these notes as quoted in banknote reporters in New York, Philadelphia, Cincinnati, and Cleveland. The study attempts to determine whether these banknotes were priced consistent with their expected net redemption value - that is, as securities are. It finds that they are not. A bank's notes did have higher prices when the bank was redeeming its notes for specie than when it was not, and banknote prices generally reflected the distances necessary to travel in order to redeem the notes, with larger ...
Staff Report , Paper 344

Working Paper
Resolving the National Banking System note-issue puzzle

Under the National Banking System, 1863-1914, national banks that deposited sufficient collateral could issue notes provided they paid a tax on notes in circulation: 1 percent per year before 1900 and 1/2 percent thereafter. Because note issue was far below the allowed maximum, an arbitrage argument predicts that short-term nominal interest rates should have been bounded above by the tax rate. They were not. That is the note-issue puzzle. Our resolution takes the form of a model in which notes play a role, but in which the profitability of note issue is not tied to anything that resembles a ...
Working Papers (Old Series) , Paper 0316

Working Paper
A model of banknote discounts

Prior to 1863, state-chartered banks in the United States issued notes - dollar-denominated promises to pay specie to the bearer on demand. Although these notes circulated at par locally, they usually were quoted at a discount outside the local area. These discounts varied by both the location of the bank and the location where the discount was being quoted. Further, these discounts were asymmetric across locations, meaning that the discounts quoted in location A on the notes of banks in location B generally differed from the discounts quoted in location B on the notes of banks in location A. ...
Working Papers , Paper 641

Working Paper
Bank liability insurance schemes before 1865

Prior to the Civil War several states established bank liability insurance schemes of two basic types. One was an insurance fund, in which member banks paid into a state-run fund that would pay losses of bank creditors. The other was a mutual guarantee system, in which survivor banks were legally responsible the liabilities of any bank that became insolvent. Both schemes did well at insuring bank creditors, but neither prevented bank panics. Bank failure rates were somewhat higher for banks that were part of these schemes. The experience with these schemes shows that regulatory incentives ...
Working Papers , Paper 679

Journal Article
Statement to Congress, October 8, 1998, (implications for the demand for Federal Reserve notes after the issuance of euro bank notes).

Federal Reserve Bulletin , Issue Dec , Pages 1054-1056

Working Paper
Costly banknote issuance and interest rates under the national banking system

The behavior of interest rates under the U.S. National Banking System is puzzling because of the apparent presence of persistent and large unexploited arbitrage opportunities for note issuing banks. Previous attempts to explain interest rate behavior have relied on the cost or the inelasticity of note issue. These attempts are not entirely satisfactory. Here we propose a new rationale to solve the puzzle. Inelastic note issuance arises endogenously because the marginal cost of issuing notes is an increasing function of circulation. We build a spatial separation model where some fraction of ...
Working Papers , Paper 601

Discussion Paper
Private money and reserve management in a random-matching model

In this paper, we develop a model of money and reserve-holding banks. We allow for private liabilities to circulate as media of exchange in a random-matching framework. Some individuals, which we identify as banks, are endowed with a technology to issue private notes and to keep reserves with a clearinghouse. Bank liabilities are redeemed according to a stochastic process that depends on the endogenous trades. We find conditions under which note redemptions act as a force that is sufficient to stabilize note issue by the banking sector.
Discussion Paper / Institute for Empirical Macroeconomics , Paper 128

Working Paper
A model of regulated private bank-note issue

A random-matching model (of money) is formulated in which there is complete public knowledge of the trading histories of a subset of the population, called banks, and no public knowledge of the trading histories of the complement of that subset, called nonbanks. Each person, whether a banker or a non banker, is assumed to have the technological capability to create indivisible, distinct and durable objects called notes. If outside money is indivisible and sufficiently scarce, then an optimal mechanism is shown to have note issue and destruction (redemption) by banks.
Working Papers , Paper 581

Journal Article
The Suffolk Bank and the Panic of 1837

The Suffolk Bank in Boston is well known as having been the clearinghouse for virtually all the banknotes that circulated in New England between 1836 and 1858. An examination of 19th century bank balance sheets shows that during and after the U.S. banking Panic of 1837, this private commercial bank also provided some services that today are provided by central banks. These include lending reserves to other banks (providing a discount window) and keeping the payments system operating. Because of Suffolk's activities, banks in New England fared better than banks elsewhere during the Panic of ...
Quarterly Review , Volume 24 , Issue Spr , Pages 3-13

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