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Keywords:Bank notes 

Working Paper
Intermediaries and payments instruments

We study an economy in which intermediaries have incentives to issue circulating liabilities as part of an equilibrium. We show that, with arbitrarily small transactions costs, only the liabilities of intermediaries will circulate, and not those of other private sector agents. Therefore, our model connects intermediation activity with the issuance of payments media, a connection that has not been made in earlier literature. We also describe conditions under which equilibrium outcomes may be volatile when private liabilities circulate. Finally, we use our model to suggest a resolution of the ...
Working Papers , Paper 2002-006

Working Paper
Costly banknote issuance and interest rates under the national banking system

The behavior of interest rates under the U.S. National Banking System is puzzling because of the apparent presence of persistent and large unexploited arbitrage opportunities for note issuing banks. Previous attempts to explain interest rate behavior have relied on the cost or the inelasticity of note issue. These attempts are not entirely satisfactory. Here we propose a new rationale to solve the puzzle. Inelastic note issuance arises endogenously because the marginal cost of issuing notes is an increasing function of circulation. We build a spatial separation model where some fraction of ...
Working Papers , Paper 601

Conference Paper
Private money creation and the Suffolk Banking System


Explaining the demand for free bank notes

This paper explains why the risky notes of banks established during the Free Banking Era (1837?63) were demanded even when relatively safe specie (gold and silver coin) was an alternative. Free bank notes were demanded because they were priced to reflect the expected value of their backing. The empirical evidence supports this explanation. Specifically, in New York, Wisconsin, and Indiana the expected value of backing was sufficient for free bank notes to circulate at par, which they did. In Minnesota the backing for notes was very poor: they exchanged well below par, being treated as ...
Staff Report , Paper 97

Working Paper
Government and private e-money-like systems: federal reserve notes and national bank notes

The period from 1914 to 1935 in the United States is unique in that it was the only time that both privately issued bank notes (national bank notes) and central-bank-issued bank notes (Federal Reserve notes) were simultaneously in circulation. This paper describes some lessons relevant to e-money from the U.S. experience during this period. It argues that Federal Reserve notes were not issued to be a superior currency to national bank notes. Rather, they were issued to enable the Federal Reserve System to act as a lender of last resort in times of financial stress. It also argues that the ...
FRB Atlanta CenFIS Working Paper , Paper 15-3

Journal Article
Explaining the demand for free bank notes

Quarterly Review , Volume 12 , Issue Spr , Pages 21-35

Journal Article
Statement to Congress, October 8, 1998, (implications for the demand for Federal Reserve notes after the issuance of euro bank notes).

Federal Reserve Bulletin , Issue Dec , Pages 1054-1056

Working Paper
Will the new $100 bill decrease counterfeiting?

A current U.S. policy is to introduce a new style of currency that is harder to counterfeit, but not immediately to withdraw from circulation all of the old-style currency. This policy is analyzed in a random-matching model of money, and its potential to decrease counterfeiting in the long run is shown. For various parameters of the model, three types of equilibria are found to occur. In only one does counterfeiting continue at its initial high level. In the other two, both genuine and counterfeit old-style money go out of circulation - immediately in one and gradually in the other. There are ...
Working Papers , Paper 571

Working Paper
A model of regulated private bank-note issue

A random-matching model (of money) is formulated in which there is complete public knowledge of the trading histories of a subset of the population, called banks, and no public knowledge of the trading histories of the complement of that subset, called nonbanks. Each person, whether a banker or a non banker, is assumed to have the technological capability to create indivisible, distinct and durable objects called notes. If outside money is indivisible and sufficiently scarce, then an optimal mechanism is shown to have note issue and destruction (redemption) by banks.
Working Papers , Paper 581

Were U.S. state banknotes priced as securities?

This study examines the pricing of U.S. state banknotes before 1860 using data on the discounts on these notes as quoted in banknote reporters in New York, Philadelphia, Cincinnati, and Cleveland. The study attempts to determine whether these banknotes were priced consistent with their expected net redemption value - that is, as securities are. It finds that they are not. A bank's notes did have higher prices when the bank was redeeming its notes for specie than when it was not, and banknote prices generally reflected the distances necessary to travel in order to redeem the notes, with larger ...
Staff Report , Paper 344


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