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Conference Paper
Demandable debt as a means of payment: banknotes versus checks
Working Paper
A model of banknote discounts
Prior to 1863, state-chartered banks in the United States issued notes - dollar-denominated promises to pay specie to the bearer on demand. Although these notes circulated at par locally, they usually were quoted at a discount outside the local area. These discounts varied by both the location of the bank and the location where the discount was being quoted. Further, these discounts were asymmetric across locations, meaning that the discounts quoted in location A on the notes of banks in location B generally differed from the discounts quoted in location B on the notes of banks in location A. ...
Conference Paper
Private money creation and the Suffolk Banking System
Working Paper
Resolving the National Banking System note-issue puzzle
Under the National Banking System, 1863-1914, national banks that deposited sufficient collateral could issue notes provided they paid a tax on notes in circulation: 1 percent per year before 1900 and 1/2 percent thereafter. Because note issue was far below the allowed maximum, an arbitrage argument predicts that short-term nominal interest rates should have been bounded above by the tax rate. They were not. That is the note-issue puzzle. Our resolution takes the form of a model in which notes play a role, but in which the profitability of note issue is not tied to anything that resembles a ...
Discussion Paper
Private money and reserve management in a random-matching model
In this paper, we develop a model of money and reserve-holding banks. We allow for private liabilities to circulate as media of exchange in a random-matching framework. Some individuals, which we identify as banks, are endowed with a technology to issue private notes and to keep reserves with a clearinghouse. Bank liabilities are redeemed according to a stochastic process that depends on the endogenous trades. We find conditions under which note redemptions act as a force that is sufficient to stabilize note issue by the banking sector.
Working Paper
Will the new $100 bill decrease counterfeiting?
A current U.S. policy is to introduce a new style of currency that is harder to counterfeit, but not immediately to withdraw from circulation all of the old-style currency. This policy is analyzed in a random-matching model of money, and its potential to decrease counterfeiting in the long run is shown. For various parameters of the model, three types of equilibria are found to occur. In only one does counterfeiting continue at its initial high level. In the other two, both genuine and counterfeit old-style money go out of circulation - immediately in one and gradually in the other. There are ...
Journal Article
Explaining the demand for free bank notes
Working Paper
Banknote exchange rate in the antebellum United States
Working Paper
European hoarding: currency use among immigrants in Switzerland
Do immigrants have a higher demand for large denominated banknotes than natives? This study examines whether cash orders for CHF 1000 notes, a banknote not used for daily transactions, is concentrated in Swiss cities with a high foreign-to-native ratio. Controlling for a range of socio-economic indicators across 250 Swiss cities, European immigrants in Switzerland are found to hoard less CHF 1000 banknotes than natives. A 1 percent increase in the immigrant-to-native ratio leads to a reduction in currency orders by CHF 4000. This negative correlation between immigrant-to-native ratio and ...
Working Paper
Bank liability insurance schemes before 1865
Prior to the Civil War several states established bank liability insurance schemes of two basic types. One was an insurance fund, in which member banks paid into a state-run fund that would pay losses of bank creditors. The other was a mutual guarantee system, in which survivor banks were legally responsible the liabilities of any bank that became insolvent. Both schemes did well at insuring bank creditors, but neither prevented bank panics. Bank failure rates were somewhat higher for banks that were part of these schemes. The experience with these schemes shows that regulatory incentives ...