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Keywords:Bank liquidity 

Speech
A new era of bank supervision

Remarks at the New York Bankers Association Financial Services Forum, New York City.
Speech , Paper 65

Speech
Managing crises without government guarantees—how do we get there?

Remarks at Banking Law Symposium 2011, Paris, France.
Speech , Paper 63

Speech
Five years since the crisis: where are we now?

Remarks at the Institute of International Bankers' Seminar on Risk Management and Regulatory/Examinations Compliance Issues.
Speech , Paper 120

Speech
Title II resolution, a useful tool but not a panacea

Remarks at 2013 Resolution Conference: Planning for the Orderly Resolution of a Global Systemically Important Bank, Washington, D.C.
Speech , Paper 121

Speech
Ending too big to fail

Remarks at the Global Economic Policy Forum, New York City.
Speech , Paper 123

Report
Liquidity hoarding

Banks hold liquid and illiquid assets. An illiquid bank that receives a liquidity shock sells assets to liquid banks in exchange for cash. We characterize the constrained efficient allocation as the solution to a planner?s problem and show that the market equilibrium is constrained inefficient, with too little liquidity and inefficient hoarding. Our model features a precautionary as well as a speculative motive for hoarding liquidity, but the inefficiency of liquidity provision can be traced to the incompleteness of markets (due to private information) and the increased price volatility that ...
Staff Reports , Paper 488

Report
Financial intermediary leverage and value at risk

We study a contracting model for the determination of leverage and balance sheet size for financial intermediaries that fund their activities through collateralized borrowing. The model gives rise to two features: First, leverage is procyclical in the sense that leverage is high when the balance sheet is large. Second, leverage and balance sheet size are both determined by the riskiness of assets. For U.S. investment banks, we find empirical support for both features of our model, that is, leverage is procyclical, and both leverage and balance sheet size are determined by measured risks. In a ...
Staff Reports , Paper 338

Report
A model of liquidity hoarding and term premia in inter-bank markets

Financial crises are associated with reduced volumes and extreme levels of rates for term inter-bank loans, reflected in the one-month and three-month Libor. We explain such stress by modeling leveraged banks? precautionary demand for liquidity. Asset shocks impair a bank?s ability to roll over debt because of agency problems associated with high leverage. In turn, banks hoard liquidity and decrease term lending as their rollover risk increases over the term of the loan. High levels of short-term leverage and illiquidity of assets lead to low volumes and high rates for term borrowing. In ...
Staff Reports , Paper 498

Report
Liquidity management of U.S. global banks: internal capital markets in the Great Recession

The recent crisis highlighted the importance of globally active banks in linking markets. One channel for this linkage is the liquidity management of these banks, specifically the regular flow of funds between parent banks and their affiliates in diverse foreign markets. We use the Great Recession as an opportunity to identify the balance-sheet shocks to parent banks in the United States and then explore which features of foreign affiliates are associated with protecting, for example, their status as important locations in sourcing funding or as destinations for foreign investment activity. ...
Staff Reports , Paper 511

Report
Shadow banking

The rapid growth of the market-based financial system since the mid-1980s changed the nature of financial intermediation in the United States profoundly. Within the market-based financial system, "shadow banks" are particularly important institutions. Shadow banks are financial intermediaries that conduct maturity, credit, and liquidity transformation without access to central bank liquidity or public sector credit guarantees. Examples of shadow banks include finance companies, asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) conduits, limited-purpose finance companies, structured investment vehicles, ...
Staff Reports , Paper 458

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