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Conference Paper
Keynote address: the networked bank
AUTHORS: Howe, Robert M.
DATE: 1996
Journal Article
Global ATM banking: casting the net
ACH and ATM systems are examples of networks, where the benefits of one participant enhance the structure's value for the other participants. Some recent results from economic theory suggest that competitive networks are preferable in a social sense to monopoly networks.
AUTHORS: Hueter, John D.; Craig, Ben R.
DATE: 1998
Journal Article
Why are ATM fees rising?
AUTHORS: Laderman, Elizabeth
DATE: 1989
Journal Article
Shared ATM networks: an uneasy alliance
AUTHORS: Laderman, Elizabeth
DATE: 1990
Journal Article
The public policy implications of state laws pertaining to automated teller machines
AUTHORS: Laderman, Elizabeth
DATE: 1990
Journal Article
Bank ATMs and ATM surcharges
The proliferation of ATMs and the pricing schemes that accompany them have attracted a great deal of attention from research economists, because they shed light on how banks compete against each other in the current environment. By studying the pattern of entry of ATMs in certain markets we can gain insight into the potential welfare consequences of the lifting of artificial price controls. This Economic Letter reports on recent research on bank ATMs and ATM surcharges.
AUTHORS: Gowrisankaran, Gautam; Krainer, John
DATE: 2005
Journal Article
Money machines
AUTHORS: Walsh, Joan
DATE: 1976
Working Paper
The welfare consequences of ATM surcharges: evidence from a structural entry model
We estimate a structural model of the market for automatic teller machines (ATMs) in order to evaluate the implications of regulating ATM surcharges on ATM entry and consumer and producer surplus. We estimate the model using data on firm and consumer locations, and identify the parameters of the model by exploiting a source of local quasi?experimental variation, that the state of Iowa banned ATM surcharges during our sample period while the state of Minnesota did not. We develop new econometric methods that allow us to estimate the parameters of equilibrium models without computing equilibria. Monte Carlo evidence shows that the estimator performs well. We find that a ban on ATM surcharges reduces ATM entry by about 12 percent, increases consumer welfare by about 10 percent and lowers producer profits by about 10 percent. Total welfare remains about the same under regimes that permit or prohibit ATM surcharges and is about 17 percent lower than the surplus maximizing level. This paper can help shed light on the theoretically ambiguous implications of free entry on consumer and producer welfare for differentiated products industries in general and ATMs in particular.
AUTHORS: Gowrisankaran, Gautam; Krainer, John
DATE: 2004
Working Paper
The impact of technology adoption on market structure
AUTHORS: Hannan, Timothy H.; McDowell, John M.
DATE: 1989
Working Paper
To surcharge or not to surcharge: an empirical investigation of ATM pricing
This paper investigates depository institutions' decisions whether or not to impose surcharges (direct usage fees) on non-depositors who use their ATMs. In addition to documenting patterns of surcharging, we examine motives for surcharging, including both direct generation of fee revenue and the potential to attract deposit customers who wish to avoid incurring surcharges at an institution's ATMs. Consistent with expectations, we find that the probability of surcharging increases with both the institution's share of market ATMs and the time since surcharging was first allowed in the state, and decreases with the local ATM density. Further, we find evidence consistent with the use of surcharges to attract deposit customers who are new to the local banking market, but find no evidence that larger banks use surcharges as a means to attract existing customers away from smaller local competitors.
AUTHORS: Hannan, Timothy H.; Kiser, Elizabeth K.; Prager, Robin A.; McAndrews, James J.
DATE: 2001