Who buys Treasury securities at auction?
The U.S. Treasury Department now releases fuller information about its auctions than in the past, including new information on investor class and bidder category. The investor class data shed light on the distribution of demand for government securities, and the bidder category data, released first, offer an early read on demand. Purchases by indirect bidders, in particular, are a fairly good proxy for foreign purchases of Treasury notes, but not Treasury bills.
AUTHORS: Fleming, Michael J.
Designing effective auctions for treasury securities
Most discussions of treasury auction design focus on the choice between two methods for issuing securities--uniform-price or discriminatory auctions. Although auction theory and much recent research appear to favor the uniform-price method, most countries conduct their treasury auctions using the discriminatory format. What are the main issues underlying the debate over effective auction design?
AUTHORS: Bartolini, Leonardo; Cottarelli, Carlo
The Treasury auction process: objectives, structure, and recent acquisitions
Treasury auctions are designed to minimize the cost of financing the national debt by promoting broad, competitive bidding and liquid secondary market trading. A review of the auction process-from the announcement of a new issue to the delivery of securities-reveals how these objectives have been met. Also highlighted are changes in the auction process that stem from recent advances in information-processing technologies and risk management techniques.
AUTHORS: Garbade, Kenneth D.; Ingber, Jeffrey F.
The emergence of \\"regular and predictable\\" as a Treasury debt management strategy
During the 1970s, U.S. Treasury officials revised the framework within which they selected the maturities of new notes and bonds. Previously, they chose maturities on an offering-by-offering basis. By 1982, the Treasury had ceased these "tactical" sales and was selling notes and bonds on a "regular and predictable" schedule. This article describes that key change in the Treasury's debt management strategy. The author shows that in 1975, Treasury officials financed an unusually rapid expansion of the federal deficit with a flurry of tactical offerings. Because the timing and maturities of the offerings followed no predictable pattern, the sales sometimes took investors by surprise, disrupting the market. These events led Treasury officials to embrace a more regularized program of regular and predictable issuance - a program they had been using for decades to auction bills. The Treasury's switch to regular and predictable issuance of notes and bonds was widely praised for reducing the element of surprise in Treasury offering announcements, facilitating investor planning, and decreasing Treasury borrowing costs.
AUTHORS: Garbade, Kenneth D.
Central bank dollar swap lines and overseas dollar funding costs
In the decade prior to the financial crisis, foreign banks? exposure to U.S.-dollar-denominated assets rose dramatically. When the crisis hit in 2007, the banks? access to dollar funding came under severe duress, with potentially dire consequences for global financial markets that could also spread to U.S. markets. The Federal Reserve responded in December 2007 by establishing temporary reciprocal currency swap lines, or facilities, with foreign central banks designed to ameliorate dollar funding stresses overseas. Drawing on rigorous analysis of the swaps, as well as insights of other economic studies and anecdotal accounts of market participants, this paper concludes that the lines were effective in reducing dollar funding costs abroad and stresses in the money markets. Furthermore, the facilities have been an integral part of the central bank toolbox for managing systemic liquidity disruptions as well as represent an important example of global policy cooperation.> In this paper, authors Linda S. Goldberg, Craig Kennedy and Jason Miu describe the events leading up to the introduction of the dollar swap lines, discuss changes to the facilities as funding conditions evolved and consider the facilities? effects on market activity. ; Title of Special Issue: Federal Reserve Policy Responses to the Financial Crisis.
AUTHORS: Kennedy, Craig; Miu, Jason; Goldberg, Linda S.
An examination of Treasury term investment interest rates
In November 2003, the Term Investment Option (TIO) program became an official cash management tool of the U.S. Treasury Department. Through TIO, the Treasury lends funds to banks for a set number of days at an interest rate determined by a single-rate auction. One reason why the Treasury introduced TIO was to try to earn a market rate of return on its excess cash balances. This article studies 166 TIO auctions from November 2003 to February 2006 to determine how TIO interest rates have compared with market rates. The author investigates the spread between TIO rates and rates on mortgage-backed-security repos, a close benchmark for TIO rates. He finds that aside from offerings with very short term lengths, the Treasury receives an interest rate on TIO auctions comparable to market rates. He also documents a negative relationship between an auction's size and the spread between TIO and repo rates. Furthermore, the Treasury's announcement and auctioning of funds on the same day does not adversely affect rate spreads, a finding that suggests that banks are indifferent to more advance notice of TIO auctions.
AUTHORS: Hrung, Warren B.
The institutionalization of treasury note and bond auctions, 1970-75
The substitution of auctions for fixed-price offerings was expected to lower the U.S. Treasury's cost of financing the federal debt. Despite this and other potential benefits, the Treasury failed in both 1935 and 1963 in its attempts to introduce regular auction sales of coupon-bearing securities. This article examines the Treasury's third and successful attempt between 1970 and 1975. The author identifies three likely reasons why the Treasury succeeded in the early 1970s: it closely imitated its successful and well-understood bill auction process, it extended the maturity of auction offerings gradually, and it was willing to modify the auction process when shortcomings became apparent.
AUTHORS: Garbade, Kenneth D.
Primary Dealers’ Waning Role in Treasury Auctions
In this post, we quantify the macroeconomic effects of central bank announcements about future federal funds rates, or forward guidance. We estimate that a commitment to lowering future rates below market expectations can have fairly strong effects on real economic activity with only small effects on inflation.
AUTHORS: Sean Myers; Fleming, Michael J.
Some observations and lessons from the crisis
Remarks at the Third Annual Connecticut Bank and Trust Company Economic Outlook Breakfast, Hartford, Connecticut.
Implementing the Federal Reserve's asset purchase program
Remarks at Global Interdependence Center Central Banking Series Event, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
AUTHORS: Sack, Brian P.