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Working Paper
Was China the first domino? assessing links between China and the rest of emerging Asia.
We assess links between China and the rest of emerging Asia. Some commentators have argued that China?s apparent devaluation in 1994 may have contributed to the Asian financial crisis. We argue that the devaluation was not economically important: The more-relevant exchange rate was a floating rate that was not devalued, and high Chinese inflation has led to a very sharp real appreciation of the currency. Although in principle, export competition with China could nevertheless have placed pressure on other Asian exporters, we argue that the striking feature of the data is the common movement between export growth from China and from other developing Asian economies. To the extent there is evidence of export competition, it is the period from about 1989 to 1993: China?s exchange rate depreciated sharply, Chinese export growth exceeded export growth of other Asian economies, and the composition of Asian exports (measured by export shares of various goods to the United States and other industrial economies) changed substantially. Finally, we speculate on the effects of the Asian crisis on China?s prospects. China?s economic growth is likely to slow because of increased trade competition as a result of the devaluation of other Asian currencies, and because of reduced capital inflows. In addition, these reduced inflows are likely to reduce job creation in the non-state sector, and hence make enterprise restructuring more difficult in China.
AUTHORS: Fernald, John G.; Edison, Hali J.; Loungani, Prakash
DATE: 1998
Working Paper
Asset bubbles, domino effects and 'lifeboats': elements of the East Asian crisis
Credit market imperfections have been blamed for the depth and persistence of the Great Depression in the USA. Could similar mechanisms have played a role in ending the East Asian miracle? After a brief account of the nature of the recent crises, we use a model of highly levered credit-constrained firms due to Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) to explore this question. As applied to land-holding property companies, it predicts greatly amplified responses to financial shocks--like the ending of the land price bubble or the fall of the exchange rate. The initial fall in asset values is followed by the ?knock-on? effects of the scramble for liquidity as companies sell land to satisfy their collateral requirements--causing land prices to fall further. This could lead to financial collapse where--like falling dominoes--prudent firms are brought down by imprudent firms. ; Key to avoiding collapse is the nature of financial stabilisation policy; in a crisis, temporary financing can prevent illiquidity becoming insolvency and launching ?lifeboats? can do the same. But the vulnerability of financial systems like those in East Asia to short-term foreign currency exposure suggests that preventive measures are also required.
AUTHORS: Miller, Marcus; Luangaram, Pongsak; Edison, Hali J.
DATE: 1998
Journal Article
Statement to Congress, January 30, 1998, (recent financial crisis in Asia)
AUTHORS: Greenspan, Alan
DATE: 1998
Journal Article
Statement to Congress, March 3, 1998, (global financial system and the current Asian crisis).
AUTHORS: Greenspan, Alan
DATE: 1998
Conference Paper
The new global economic geography
AUTHORS: Fischer, Stanley
DATE: 2006
Journal Article
Effects of Asian financial crisis uncertain for District
AUTHORS: Lotterman, Edward
DATE: 1998
Journal Article
Inflation, asset markets, and economic stabilization: lessons from Asia
In 1980's, a new convention emerged in the economics profession - that central banks' primary, even sole, responsibility should be controlling consumer price inflation. By the 1990's, this view was gaining credibility in policy circles, and various countries mandated that their central banks make inflation their primary focus (generally with and escape clause in the event of a severe economic shock). Here in the United States, this orthodoxy never gained official status; rather, the U.S. policy goal remains promoting stable long-term growth using a variety of theoretical approaches. ; The recent problems in East Asia, as well as earlier difficulties in Japan, raise the question of whether such a concentrated focus on inflation became tunnel vision. Drawing on the crises in Japan and other Asian countries, with reference to comparable episodes in the United States, this article suggests that a preoccupation with inflation may have lulled policymakers and investors into ignoring useful signals from stock, real estate, and currency markets and from emerging imbalances in the real economy. Whether such imbalances would have been better addressed by monetary policy, or by improved disclosure, supervisory intervention, or tax policy, a broader perspective might have identified problems in Asia before they assumed such crippling proportions. ; This article concludes by suggesting that policymakers may want to look for signs of overheating emanating from asset markets and from emerging imbalances in the real economy, even when consumer prices are well behaved. Signs that high levels of debt may be financing increasingly optimistic investments warrant particular concern. The article also stresses the vulnerabilities that newly liberalized financial markets may introduce and the importance of measures that encourage the private sector to price risk more accurately and force it to bear the costs of international financial crises more fully. Overall, it advocates an eclectic approach to assessing economic performance.
AUTHORS: Browne, Lynn E.; Little, Jane Sneddon; Hellerstein, Rebecca
DATE: 1998
Journal Article
Anatomy of a currency crisis
AUTHORS: Little, Jane Sneddon
DATE: 1997
Conference Paper
Market lessons for avoiding the next currency crash: lessons from Asia
AUTHORS: Persaud, Avinash
DATE: 1998
Conference Paper
After Asia: new directions for the international financial system
AUTHORS: Dornbusch, Rudiger W.
DATE: 1998