Search Results
Discussion Paper
Mitigating the Risk of Runs on Uninsured Deposits: the Minimum Balance at Risk
The incentives that drive bank runs have been well understood since the seminal work of Nobel laureates Douglas Diamond and Philip Dybvig (1983). When a bank is suspected to be insolvent, early withdrawers can get the full value of their deposits. If and when the bank runs out of funds, however, the bank cannot pay remaining depositors. As a result, all depositors have an incentive to run. The failures of Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank remind us that these incentives are still present for uninsured depositors, that is, those whose bank deposits are larger than deposit insurance ...
Working Paper
The 2023 Banking Turmoil and the Bank Term Funding Program
We use high-frequency data to examine the effectiveness of the Bank Term Funding Program (BTFP) in supporting the liquidity positions of vulnerable banks during the March 2023 banking turmoil. We uncover three key findings. First, our high-frequency data confirm that banks with high reliance on uninsured deposits and large unrealized losses on securities holdings suffered larger deposit outflows at the onset of the episode. Second, the BTFP played an outsized role in meeting these outflows at banks with larger securities losses, reflecting the at-par valuation of securities collateral at ...
Report
Investor Attention to Bank Risk During the Spring 2023 Bank Run
We examine how investors’ perception of bank balance sheet risk evolved before and during the March-April 2023 bank run. To do so, we estimate the covariance (“beta”) of bank excess stock returns with returns on factors constructed from long-short portfolios sorted on shares of uninsured deposits and unrealized losses on securities. We find that the market’s perception of bank risk shifted in both the time series and the cross-section. From January 2022 to February 2023, both factor betas were mostly insignificant, but after the bank run started, they became positive and significant ...