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Keywords:unemployment benefits 

Discussion Paper
Do Unemployment Benefits Expirations Help Explain the Surge in Job Openings?

Job openings are arguably one of the most important indicators of recovery in the labor market, as they reflect employers? willingness to hire. The number of job openings has recovered steadily since the recession, yet through the end of 2013, the openings rate was still substantially below its pre-recession peak (see chart below). Starting in January 2014, however, the number of job openings increased dramatically, up by 20 percent through June 2014, and job openings relative to employment jumped back to the peak of the previous expansion. In this post, we argue that the expiration of the ...
Liberty Street Economics , Paper 20140930

Journal Article
Increasing Employment by Halting Pandemic Unemployment Benefits

In mid-2021, 26 states halted participation in all or some federal emergency unemployment benefits (EUB) programs before those programs' federal funding lapsed. This article uses this asynchronous EUB cessation between early- and late-halting states to estimate the causal impact of benefit cessation on employment. We find that cessation increased employment by 29 persons for every 100 (pre-halt) EUB recipients. Expressed as a number of jobs, if all states had halted EUB in June, September employment would have been 3.4 million persons higher relative to a no-halt counterfactual. Late-halting ...
Review , Volume 104 , Issue 3 , Pages 166-177

Working Paper
The Jobs Effect of Ending Pandemic Unemployment Benefits: A State-Level Analysis

This paper uses the asynchronous cessation of emergency unemployment benefits (EUB) in 2021 to investigate the jobs impact of ending unemployment benefits. While some states stopped providing EUB in September, others stopped as early as June. Using the cessation month as an instrument, we estimate the effect on employment of reducing unemployment rolls. In the second month following a state’s program termination, for every 100 person reduction in beneficiaries, state employment causally increased by about 27 persons. The effect is statistically different from zero and robust to a wide array ...
Working Papers , Paper 2022-010

Working Paper
Optimal unemployment insurance and cyclical fluctuations

The authors study the design of optimal unemployment insurance in an environment with moral hazard and cyclical fluctuations. The optimal unemployment insurance contract balances the insurance motive to provide consumption for the unemployed with the provision of incentives to search for a job. This balance is affected by aggregate conditions, as recessions are characterized by reductions in job finding rates. We show how benefits should vary with aggregate conditions in an optimal contract. In a special case of the model, the optimal contract can be solved in closed form. We show how this ...
FRB Atlanta CQER Working Paper , Paper 2015-2

Working Paper
Recent Extensions of U.S. Unemployment Benefits: Search Responses in Alternative Labor Market States

In response to the 2007-09 ?Great Recession,? the maximum duration of U.S. unemployment benefits was increased from the normal level of 26 weeks to an unprecedented 99 weeks. I estimate the impact of these extensions on job search, comparing them with the more limited extensions associated with the milder 2001 recession. The analyses rely on monthly matched microdata from the Current Population Survey. I find that a 10-week extension of UI benefits raises unemployment duration by about 1.5 weeks, with little variation across the two episodes. This estimate lies in the middle-to-upper end of ...
Working Paper Series , Paper 2014-13

Journal Article
Employment Effects of Pandemic Emergency Unemployment Benefits: Incentives Matter

The employment effects of halting programs that granted emergency unemployment benefits during the pandemic were substantial and differed across age groups.
The Regional Economist

The End of Emergency Pandemic Unemployment Benefits in 2021

Although many saw the $300 weekly add-on as the key disincentive to work, the large drop in benefit recipients was driven primarily by the halt in other federal jobless programs.
On the Economy

Ending Pandemic Unemployment Benefits Linked to Job Growth

A new state-level analysis finds that ending emergency unemployment benefits had a statistically significant positive impact on employment.
On the Economy

Working Paper
The Jobs Effect of Ending Pandemic Unemployment Benefits: A State-Level Analysis

This note uses the asynchronous cessation of emergency unemployment benefits (EUB) in 2021 to investigate the jobs impact of ending unemployment benefits. While some states stopped providing EUB in September, other states stopped in June and July. Using the cessation month as an instrument, we estimate the causal effect on employment of reducing unemployment rolls. In the first three months following a state’s program termination, for every 100 person reduction in beneficiaries, state employment causally increased by about 35 persons. The effect is statistically different from zero and ...
Working Papers , Paper 2022-010

Working Paper
Reservation Wages Revisited: Empirics with the Canonical Model

Using innovative longitudinal data from a survey of unemployment insurance (UI) recipients, we test several implications of a canonical job search model for reservation wages during unemployment spells. First, consistent with the model, we find that reservation wages fall faster when UI benefit durations are shorter. However, workers set their initial reservation wages higher, and adjust them slower, relative to model predictions. Second, workers' expectations—elicited at the beginning of their unemployment spell—about how their reservation wage will evolve if they remain unemployed are ...
Working Papers , Paper 24-23

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