Working Paper
Collective Moral Hazard and the Interbank Market
Altinoglu, Levent; Stiglitz, Joseph E. (2020-12-02)
The concentration of risk within financial system is considered to be a source of systemic instability. We propose a theory to explain the structure of the financial system and show how it alters the risk taking incentives of financial institutions. We build a model of portfolio choice and endogenous contracts in which the government optimally intervenes during crises. By issuing financial claims to other institutions, relatively risky institutions endogenously become large and interconnected. This structure enables institutions to share the risk of systemic crisis in a privately optimal way, ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2020-098

Speech
The Financial Crisis: perspectives from a decade on: remarks to the Administrative and Banking Law Committees of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, New York City
Held, Michael (2017-11-15)
Remarks to the Administrative and Banking Law Committees of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, New York City.
Speech

Speech
Structural and cyclical macroprudential objectives in supervisory stress testing: remarks at The Effects of Post-Crisis Banking Reforms, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York City
Hirtle, Beverly (2018-06-22)
Remarks at The Effects of Post-Crisis Banking Reforms, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York City.
Speech , Paper 290