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Working Paper
Modeling Your Stress Away
Stebunovs, Viktors; Niepmann, Friederike
(2018-07-19)
We investigate systematic changes in banks' projected credit losses between the 2014 and 2016 EBA stress tests, employing methodology from Philippon et al. (2017). We find that projected credit losses were smoothed across the tests through systematic model adjustments. Those banks whose losses would have increased the most from 2014 to 2016 due to changes in the supervisory scenarios-keeping the models constant and controlling for changes in the riskiness of underlying portfolios-saw the largest decrease in losses due to model changes. Model changes were more pronounced for banks that rely ...
International Finance Discussion Papers
, Paper 1232
Discussion Paper
CCAR: More than a Stress Test
Hirtle, Beverly
(2012-07-02)
The Federal Reserve recently released the results of its latest stress test of large bank holding companies (BHCs). While the stress test results have received a lot of attention, they are just one part of a much larger effort by the Federal Reserve to ensure that these large BHCs have robust processes for determining how much capital they need to maintain access to funding and continue to serve as credit intermediaries, even under stressed conditions. In this post, I describe these larger efforts and the role that the stress test plays in them.
Liberty Street Economics
, Paper 20120702
Working Paper
The Impact of Post Stress Tests Capital on Bank Lending
Berrospide, Jose M.; Bassett, William F.
(2018-12-21)
We investigate one channel through which the annual bank stress tests, as part of the Federal Reserve?s Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR) review, could unexpectedly affect the provision of bank credit. To quantify the impact of the stress tests on lending, we compare the capital implied by the supervisory stress tests with the level of capital implied by the banks? own models, a measure we call the capital gap. We then study the impact of the capital gap on the loan growth of BHCs subject to supervisory or bank-run stress tests. Consistent with previous results in the bank ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series
, Paper 2018-087
Working Paper
Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions Under Lender Scrutiny
Qiu, Buhui; Wang, Teng
(2024-04-19)
This paper examines corporate mergers and acquisitions (M&A) outcomes under lender scrutiny. Using the unique shocks of U.S. supervisory stress testing, we find that firms under increased lender scrutiny after their relationship banks fail stress tests engage in fewer but higher-quality M&A deals. Evidence from comprehensive supervisory data reveals improved credit quality for newly originated M&A-related loans under enhanced lender scrutiny. This improvement is further evident in positive stock return reactions to M&A deals financed by loans subject to enhanced lender scrutiny. As companies ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series
, Paper 2024-025
Working Paper
The failure of supervisory stress testing: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and OFHEO
Frame, W. Scott; Gerardi, Kristopher S.; Willen, Paul S.
(2015-03-01)
Stress testing has recently become a critical risk management and capital planning tool for large financial institutions and their supervisors around the world. However, the one prior U.S. experience tying stress test results to capital requirements was a spectacular failure: the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight's (OFHEO) risk-based capital stress test for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. We study a key component of OFHEO's model?30-year fixed-rate mortgage performance?and find two key problems. First, OFHEO had left the model specification and associated parameters static for the ...
FRB Atlanta Working Paper
, Paper 2015-3
Working Paper
Mandatory Disclosure and Financial Contagion
Alvarez, Fernando; Barlevy, Gadi
(2014-04-28)
This paper analyzes the welfare implications of mandatory disclosure of losses at financial institutions when it is common knowledge that some banks have incurred losses but not which ones. We develop a model that features contagion, meaning that banks not hit by shocks may still suffer losses because of their exposure to banks that are. In addition, we assume banks can profitably invest funds provided by outsiders, but will divert these funds if their equity is low. Investors thus value knowing which banks were hit by shocks to assess the equity of the banks they invest in. We find that when ...
Working Paper Series
, Paper WP-2014-4
Report
Evaluating the information in the Federal Reserve stress tests
Kovner, Anna; Hirtle, Beverly; Flannery, Mark J.
(2015-10-01)
We present evidence that the Federal Reserve stress tests produce information about both the stress-tested bank holding companies and the overall state of the banking industry. Our evidence goes beyond a standard event study, which cannot differentiate between small abnormal returns and large, but opposite?signed, abnormal stock returns. We find that stress test disclosures are associated with significantly higher absolute abnormal returns, as well as higher abnormal trading volume. More levered and riskier holding companies seem to be more affected by the stress test information. We find no ...
Staff Reports
, Paper 744
Discussion Paper
Becoming More Alike? Comparing Bank and Federal Reserve Stress Test Results
Hirtle, Beverly; McKay, Eric; Kovner, Anna
(2014-07-21)
Stress tests have become an important method of assessing whether financial institutions have enough capital to operate in bad economic conditions. Under the provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, both the Federal Reserve and large U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs) are required to do annual stress tests and to disclose these results to the public. While the BHCs’ and the Federal Reserve’s projections are made under the same macroeconomic scenario, the results differ, primarily because of differences in the models used to make the projections. In this post, we look at the 2014 stress test ...
Liberty Street Economics
, Paper 20140721
Working Paper
Stress tests and information disclosure
Goldstein, Itay; Leitner, Yaron
(2015-02-18)
Supersedes Working Paper 13-26 . We study an optimal disclosure policy of a regulator that has information about banks? ability to overcome future liquidity shocks. We focus on the following tradeoff: Disclosing some information may be necessary to prevent a market breakdown, but disclosing too much information destroys risk-sharing opportunities (the Hirshleifer effect). We find that during normal times, no disclosure is optimal, but during bad times, partial disclosure is optimal. We characterize the optimal form of this partial disclosure. We relate our results to the Bayesian persuasion ...
Working Papers
, Paper 15-10
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