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Working Paper
Tax Revolts and Sovereign Defaults
Arce, Fernando; Werquin, Nicolas; Morgan, Jan (2024-02)
Protests and fiscal crises often coincide, with complex causal dynamics at play. We examine the interaction between tax revolts and sovereign risk using a quantitative structural model calibrated to Argentina during the Macri administration (2015-2019). In the model, the government can be controlled by political parties with different preferences for redistribution. Households may opt to revolt in response to the fiscal policies of the ruler. While revolts entail economic costs, they also increase the likelihood of political turnover. Our model mirrors the data by generating political crises ...
Working Paper Series , Paper WP 2024-07

Working Paper
Sovereign Risk and Fiscal Information: A Look at the U.S. State Default of the 1840s
Traum, Nora; Bi, Huixin (2019-06-01)
This paper examines how newspaper reporting affects government bond prices during the U.S. state default of the 1840s. Using unsupervised machine learning algorithms, the paper first constructs novel ``fiscal information indices'' for state governments based on U.S. newspapers at the time. The impact of the indices on government bond prices varied over time. Before the crisis, the entry of new western states into the bond market spurred competition: more state-specific fiscal news imposed downward pressure on bond prices for established states in the market. During the crisis, more ...
Research Working Paper , Paper RWP 19-4

Working Paper
Avoiding Sovereign Default Contagion: A Normative Analysis
Mallucci, Enrico; De Ferra, Sergio (2020-02-27)
Should debtor countries support each other during sovereign debt crises? We answer this question through the lens of a two-country sovereign-default model that we calibrate to the euro-area periphery. First, we look at cross-country bailouts. We find that whenever agents anticipate their existence, bailouts induce moral hazard an reduce welfare. Second, we look at the borrowing choices of a global central borrower. We find that it borrows less than individual governments and, as such, defaults become less frequent and welfare increases. Finally, we show that central borrower's policies can be ...
International Finance Discussion Papers , Paper 1275

Report
Fiscal Austerity during Debt Crises
Bai, Yan; Arellano, Cristina (2016-01-26)
This paper constructs a dynamic model in which fiscal restrictions interact with government borrowing and default. The government faces fiscal constraints; it cannot adjust tax rates or impose lump-sum taxes on the private sector, but it can adjust public consumption and foreign debt. When foreign debt is sufficiently high, however, the government can choose to default to increase domestic public and private consumption by freeing up the resources used to pay the debt. Two types of defaults arise in this environment: fiscal defaults and aggregate defaults. Fiscal defaults occur because of the ...
Staff Report , Paper 525

Working Paper
A Journey in the History of Sovereign Defaults on Domestic-Law Public Debt
Erce, Aitor; Mallucci, Enrico; Picarelli, Mattia (2022-03-18)
We introduce a novel database on sovereign defaults that involve public debt instruments governed by domestic law. By systematically reviewing a large number of sources, we identify 134 default and restructuring events of domestic debt instruments, in 52 countries from 1980 to 2018. Domestic-law defaults are a global phenomenon. Over time, they have become larger and more frequent than foreign-law defaults. Domestic-law debt restructurings proceed faster than foreign ones, often through extensions of maturities and amendments to the coupon structure. While face value reductions are rare, ...
International Finance Discussion Papers , Paper 1338

Working Paper
Distributional Incentives in an Equilibrium Model of Domestic Sovereign Default
D'Erasmo, Pablo; Mendoza, Enrique G. (2016-08-09)
Europe?s debt crisis resembles historical episodes of outright default on domestic public debt about which little research exists. This paper proposes a theory of domestic sovereign default based on distributional incentives affecting the welfare of risk-averse debt and non-debtholders. A utilitarian government cannot sustain debt if default is costless. If default is costly, debt with default risk is sustainable, and debt falls as the concentration of debt ownership rises. A government favoring bondholders can also sustain debt, with debt rising as ownership becomes more concentrated. These ...
Working Papers , Paper 16-23

Working Paper
The Economics of Sovereign Debt, Bailouts and the Eurozone Crisis
Gourinchas, Pierre-Olivier; Martin, Philippe; Messer, Todd (2022-08-03)
Despite a formal 'no-bailout clause; we estimate significant net present value transfers from the European Union to Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain, ranging from roughly 0.5% (Ireland) to a whopping 43% (Greece) of2010 output during the Eurozone crisis. We propose a model to analyze and understand bailouts in a monetary union, and the large observed differences across countries. We characterize bailout size and likelihood as a function of the economic fundamentals (economic activity, debt-to-gdp ratio, default costs). Our model embeds a 'Southern view' of the crisis (transfers ...
International Finance Discussion Papers , Paper 1351

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