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Keywords:signaling 

Working Paper
Delphic and Odyssean Monetary Policy Shocks: Evidence from the Euro Area

We use financial intraday data to identify monetary policy surprises in the euro area. We find that monetary policy statements and press conferences after European Central Bank (ECB) Governing Council meetings convey information that moves the yield curve far out. Moreover, the nature of the information revealed in a narrow window around these statements and press conferences evolved over time. Until 2013, unexpected variations in future interest rates were positively correlated with the changes in market-based measure of inflation expectations consistent with news on future macroeconomic ...
Working Paper Series , Paper WP-2018-12

Working Paper
Equilibrium with Mutual Organizations in Adverse Selection Economies

An equilibrium concept in the Debreu (1954) theory-of-value tradition is developed for a class of adverse selection economies and applied to the Spence signaling and Rothschild-Stiglitz (1976) adverse selection environments. The equilibrium exists and is optimal. Further, all equilibria have the same individual type utility vector. The economies are large with a finite number of types that maximize expected utility on an underlying commodity space. An implication of the analysis is that the invisible hand works for this class of adverse selection economies.
Working Papers , Paper 717

Report
Signaling with Private Monitoring

A sender signals her private information to a receiver who privately monitors the sender’s behavior, while the receiver transmits his private inferences back through an imperfect public signal of his actions. In a linear-quadratic-Gaussian setup in continuous time, we construct linear Markov equilibria, where the state variables are the players’ beliefs up to the sender’s second order belief. This state is an explicit function of the sender’s past play—hence, her private information—which leads to separation through the second-order belief channel. We examine the implications of ...
Staff Reports , Paper 994

Working Paper
Delphic and Odyssean Monetary Policy Shocks: Evidence from the Euro Area

What drives the strong reaction of financial markets to central bank communication on the days of policy decisions? We highlight the role of two factors that we identify from high-frequency monetary surprises: news on future macroeconomic conditions (Delphic shocks) and news on future monetary policy shocks (Odyssean shocks). These two shocks move the yield curve in the same direction but have opposite effects on financial conditions and macroeconomic expectations. A drop in future interest rates that is associated with a negative Delphic (Odyssean) shock is perceived as being contractionary ...
Working Papers , Paper 19-17

Working Paper
Are Lemons Sold First? Dynamic Signaling in the Mortgage Market

A central result in the theory of adverse selection in asset markets is that informed sellers can signal quality and obtain higher prices by delaying trade. This paper provides some of the first evidence of a signaling mechanism through trade delays using the residential mortgage market as a laboratory. We find a strong relationship between mortgage performance and time to sale for privately securitized mortgages. Additionally, deals made up of more seasoned mortgages are sold at lower yields. These effects are strongest in the "Alt-A" segment of the market, where mortgages are often sold ...
FRB Atlanta Working Paper , Paper 2016-8

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