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Working Paper
U.S. Housing as a Global Safe Asset: Evidence from China Shocks
This paper demonstrates that the measured stock of China's holding of U.S. assets could be much higher than indicated by the U.S. net international investment position data due to unrecorded historical Chinese inflows into an increasingly popular global safe haven asset: U.S. residential real estate. We first use aggregate capital flows data to show that the increase in unrecorded capital inflows in the U.S. balance of payment accounts over the past decade is mainly linked to inflows from China into U.S. housing markets. Then, using a unique web traffic dataset that provides a direct measure ...
Working Paper
The Financial Origins of Non-Fundamental Risk
We formalize the idea that the financial sector can be a source of non-fundamental risk. Households' desire to hedge against price volatility can generate price volatility in equilibrium, even absent fundamental risk. Fearing that asset prices may fall, risk-averse households demand safe assets from leveraged intermediaries, whose issuance of safe assets exposes the economy to self-fulfilling fire sales. Policy can eliminate nonfundamental risk by (i) increasing the supply of publicly backed safe assets, through issuing government debt or bailing out intermediaries, or (ii) reducing the ...
Working Paper
The Replacement of Safe Assets: Evidence from the U.S. Bond Portfolio
The expansion in financial sector "safe" assets, largely in the form of structured products from the U.S. and the Caribbean, in the lead-up to the global financial crisis has by now been fairly well documented. Using a unique dataset derived from security-level data on U.S. portfolio holdings of foreign securities, we show that since the crisis, it is mostly the foreign financial sector that appears to have met U.S. demand for safe and liquid investment assets by expanding its supply of debt securities. We also find a strong negative correlation between the foreign share of the U.S. ...
Working Paper
Private Money Creation with Safe Assets and Term Premia
It has been documented that an increase in the demand for safe assets induces the private sector to create more money-like claims. Focusing on private repos backed by U.S. Treasury securities, I show that an increase in the demand for safe assets leads to a decreases in the issuance of Treasury repos. The intuition is that Treasury securities already function as a safe asset, thus in terms of safe asset creation, private Treasury repos are neutral. In the model, Treasury repos are beneficial because they shift risk (i.e. term premia) from relatively risk averse households to a more risk ...
Working Paper
A Theory of Safe Asset Creation, Systemic Risk, and Aggregate Demand
This paper presents a theory of safe asset creation and the interactions between systemic risk and aggregate demand. The creation of private safe assets by financial intermediaries requires them to take leverage, which generates a risk of future crisis (systemic risk) in which intermediaries liquidate assets to service their debt. In contrast, the creation of public safe assets by the government does not generate systemic risk as the government's power to tax allows it to better absorb losses. The level of systemic risk determines the neutral rate of interest through households' precautionary ...
Working Paper
The Demand for Short-Term, Safe Assets and Financial Stability: Some Evidence and Implications for Central Bank Policies
A number of researchers have recently argued that the growth of the shadow banking system in the years preceding the recent U.S. financial crisis was driven by rising demand for "money-like" claims--short-term, safe instruments (STSI)--from institutional investors and nonfinancial firms. These instruments carry a money premium that lowers their yields. While government securities are an important part of the supply of STSI, financial intermediaries also take advantage of this money premium when they issue certain types of low-risk, short-term debt, such as asset-backed commercial paper or ...
Discussion Paper
What Makes a Safe Asset Safe?
Over the last decade, the concept of “safe assets” has received increasing attention, from regulators and private market participants, as well as researchers. This attention has led to the uncovering of some important details and nuances of what makes an asset “safe” and why it matters. In this blog post, we provide a review of the different aspects of safe assets, discuss possible reasons why they may be beneficial for investors, and give concrete examples of what these assets are in practice.
Working Paper
Quantities and Covered-Interest Parity
Studies of intermediated arbitrage argue that bank balance sheets are an important consideration, yet little evidence exists on banks’ positioning in this context. Using confidential supervisory data (covering $25 trillion in daily notional exposures) we examine banks’ positions in connection with covered-interest parity (CIP) deviations. Exploiting cross-sectional variation in CIP deviations that have largely challenged existing theories, we document three novel forces that drive bases: 1) foreign safe asset scarcity, 2) market power and segmentation of banks specializing in different ...
Working Paper
Investor Demands for Safety, Bank Capital, and Liquidity Measurement
We construct a model of a bank's optimal funding choice, where the bank negotiates with both safety-driven short-term bondholders and (mostly) risk-taking long-term bondholders. We establish that investor demands for safety create a negative relationship between the bank's capital choices and short-term funding, as well as negative relationships between capital and common measures of bank liquidity. Consistent with our model, our bank-level empirical analysis of these capital-liquidity tradeoffs show (1) that bank liquidity measures have a strong and negative relationship to its capital ratio ...
Report
Fragility of Safe Asset Markets
In March 2020, safe asset markets experienced surprising and unprecedented price crashes. We explain how strategic investor behavior can create such market fragility in a model with investors valuing safety, investors valuing liquidity, and constrained dealers. While safety investors and liquidity investors can interact symbiotically with offsetting trades in times of stress, liquidity investors’ strategic interaction harbors the potential for self-fulfilling fragility. When the market is fragile, standard flight-to-safety can have a destabilizing effect and trigger a “dash-for-cash” by ...