Search Results
Working Paper
Financing Modes and Lender Monitoring
Shadow banks are widely believed to be a creation of financial regulation and regulatory arbitrage. We show that bank and nonbank modes of financing can emerge endogenously in a simple borrower-lender framework absent regulatory arbitrage or policy interventions. The coexistence of banks and shadow banks in the absence of regulatory intervention speaks to the importance of shadow banks as alternative modes of financial intermediation. We explore the scope of regulation in determining the size and location of shadow banking, as opposed to how regulation can be designed to curtail shadow bank ...
Report
Bank leverage limits and regulatory arbitrage: new evidence on a recurring question
Banks are regulated more than most firms, making them good subjects to study regulatory arbitrage (avoidance). Their latest arbitrage opportunity may be the new leverage rule covering the largest U.S. banks; leverage rules require equal capital against assets with unequal risks, so banks can effectively relax the leverage constraint by increasing asset risk. Consistent with that conjecture, we find that banks covered by the new rule shifted to riskier, higher yielding securities relative to control banks. The shift began almost precisely when the rule was finalized in 2014, well before it ...
Discussion Paper
Leverage Ratio Arbitrage All Over Again
Leverage limits as a form of capital regulation have a well-known, potential bug: If banks can’t lever returns as desired, they can boost returns on equity by shifting toward riskier, higher yielding assets. That reach for yield is the leverage rule “arbitrage.” But would banks do that? In a previous post, we discussed evidence from our working paper that banks did do just that in response to the new leverage rule that took effect in 2018. This post discusses new findings in our revised paper on when and how banks arbitraged.
Discussion Paper
Insurance Companies and the Growth of Corporate Loan Securitization
Collateralized loan obligation (CLO) issuances in the United States increased by a factor of thirteen between 2009 and 2019, with the volume of outstanding CLOs more than doubling to approach $647 billion by the end of that period. While researchers and policy makers have been investigating the impact of this growth on the cost and riskiness of corporate loans and the potential implications for financial stability, less attention has been paid to the drivers of this phenomenon. In this post, which is based on our recent paper, we shed light on the role that insurance companies have played in ...
Discussion Paper
Banks and Nonbanks Are Not Separate, but Interwoven
In our previous post, we documented the significant growth of nonbank financial institutions (NBFIs) over the past decade, but also argued for and showed evidence of NBFIs’ dependence on banks for funding and liquidity support. In this post, we explain that the observed growth of NBFIs reflects banks optimally changing their business models in response to factors such as regulation, rather than banks stepping away from lending and risky activities and being substituted by NBFIs. The enduring bank-NBFI nexus is best understood as an ever-evolving transformation of risks that were hitherto ...
Report
Insurance Companies and the Growth of Corporate Loans' Securitization
Insurance companies nonupled their CLO investments in the post-crisis period. This growth has far outpaced that of loans and bonds and is characterized by a strong preference for mezzanine tranches over triple-A tranches. Conditional on capital charges, insurance companies invest more in bonds and CLO tranches with higher yields. Importantly, they prefer CLO tranches because these carry higher yields relative to bonds. Preferences increased following the 2010 capital regulatory reform, resulting in insurance companies holding 40 percent of outstanding mezzanine tranches. Insurance companies ...
Report
Where Do Banks End and NBFIs Begin?
In recent years, assets of nonbank financial intermediaries (NBFIs) have grown significantly relative to those of banks. These two sectors are commonly viewed either as operating in parallel, performing different activities, or as substitutes, performing substantially similar activities, with banks inside and NBFIs outside the perimeter of banking regulation. We argue instead that NBFI and bank businesses and risks are so interwoven that they are better described as having transformed over time, rather than as having migrated from banks to NBFIs. These transformations are at least in part a ...