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Report
Payout Restrictions and Bank Risk-Shifting
This paper studies the effects of regulatory payout restrictions on bank risk-shifting. Using policies imposed during the Covid-crisis on U.S. banks as a natural experiment and a high frequency differences-in-differences approach, we show that, when payouts are restricted, banks’ equity prices fall while their debt values appreciate. Moreover, banks that are ex-ante more exposed to the payout restrictions decrease risk-taking in lending relative to less exposed banks. Consistent with a risk-shifting channel, these effects revert once restrictions are lifted. These results indicate that ...
Working Paper
Banking Regulation with Risk of Sovereign Default
Banking regulation routinely designates some assets as safe and thus does not require banks to hold any additional capital to protect against losses from these assets. A typical such safe asset is domestic government debt. There are numerous examples of banking regulation treating domestic government bonds as ?safe,? even when there is clear risk of default on these bonds. We show, in a parsimonious model, that this failure to recognize the riskiness of government debt allows (and induces) domestic banks to ?gamble? with depositors? funds by purchasing risky government bonds (and assets ...
Discussion Paper
Do Payout Restrictions Reduce Bank Risk?
In June 2020, the Federal Reserve issued stringent payout restrictions for the largest banks in the United States as part of its policy response to the COVID-19 crisis. Similar curbs on share buybacks and dividend payments were adopted in other jurisdictions, including in the eurozone, the U.K., and Canada. Payout restrictions were aimed at enhancing banks’ resiliency amid heightened economic uncertainty and concerns about the risk of large losses. But besides being a tool to build capital buffers and preserve bank equity, payout restrictions may also prevent risk-shifting. This post, which ...