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Zero Settlement Risk Token Systems
How might modern settlement systems with distributed ledger technology achieve zero settlement risk? We consider the design of settlement systems that satisfies two integral features: information-leakage proof and zero settlement risk. Legacy settlement systems partition private information but are vulnerable to settlement fails. A token system with dynamic ownership representation, or a dynamic ledger, can be designed to achieve both, as long as it employs a protocol that enforces two restrictions: programs must be immediately implemented and must involve transactions based on verifiable ...
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Optimal Design of Tokenized Markets
Trades in today’s financial system are inherently subject to settlement uncertainty. This paper explores tokenization as a potential technological solution. A token system, by enabling programmability of assets, can be designed to eradicate settlement uncertainty. We study the allocations achieved in a decentralized market with either the legacy settlement system or a token system. Tokenization can improve efficiency in markets subject to a limited commitment problem. However, it also materially alters the information environment, which in turn aggravates a hold-up problem. This limits ...
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Programming Money Without Programmable Money
Programmability is at the heart of ongoing work on the future of money and payments by central banks around the world. Despite its potential, there is growing concern that programmability conflicts with the provision of “good” money. This paper overviews key principles of “good” money and argues that the discourse on programmability inadequately differentiates between programmable money, which is generally negatively viewed, and programmable payments, which is generally accepted as part of the future. We provide a framework for programmable monetary systems that sharply distinguishes ...