Search Results
Speech
The role of the New York Fed as administrator and producer of reference rates: remarks at the Annual Primary Dealer Meeting, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York City
Remarks at the Annual Primary Dealer Meeting, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York City.
Discussion Paper
The 2022 Spike in Corporate Security Settlement Fails
Settlement fails in corporate securities increased sharply in 2022, reaching levels not seen since the 2007-09 financial crisis. As a fraction of trading volume, fails that involve primary dealers reached an all-time high in the week of March 23, 2022. In this post, we investigate the 2022 spike in settlement fails for corporate securities and discuss potential drivers for this increase, including trading volume, corporate issuance, fails in bond ETFs, and operational problems.
Discussion Paper
Primary Dealers’ Waning Role in Treasury Auctions
In this post, we quantify the macroeconomic effects of central bank announcements about future federal funds rates, or forward guidance. We estimate that a commitment to lowering future rates below market expectations can have fairly strong effects on real economic activity with only small effects on inflation.
Speech
Reducing the size of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet: the benefits of moving gradually and predictably: remarks to the National Association of Securities Professionals, New York City
Remarks to the National Association of Securities Professionals, New York City.
Report
The early years of the primary dealer system
This paper presents a history of the primary dealer system from the late 1930s to the early 1950s. The paper focuses on two formal programs: the ?recognized? dealer program adopted by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in 1939 and the ?qualified? dealer program adopted by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) in 1944 and abandoned in 1953. Following his selection as Manager of the System Open Market Account (SOMA) in 1939, Robert Rouse formalized the New York Fed?s system of ?recognized? dealer counterparties. Although the Bank typically dealt with recognized dealers, it also did ...
Speech
The role of best practices in supporting market integrity and effectiveness: remarks at the 2016 Primary Dealers Meeting, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York City
Remarks at the 2016 Primary Dealers Meeting, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York City.
Report
Taking orders and taking notes: dealer information sharing in financial markets
The use of order flow information by financial firms has come to the forefront of the regulatory debate. Central to this discussion is whether a dealer who acquires information by taking client orders can share that information. We explore how information sharing affects dealers, clients, and issuer revenues in U.S. Treasury auctions. Because one cannot observe alternative information regimes, we build a model, calibrate it to auction results data, and use it to quantify counterfactuals. We estimate that yearly auction revenues with full information sharing (with clients and between dealers) ...
Working Paper
Dealer Leverage and Exchange Rates: Heterogeneity Across Intermediaries
In line with a growing literature on financial intermediary asset pricing, we find that changes in the leverage of primary dealers have predictive power in forecasting exchange rates. Unlike previous studies, we find that primary dealer heterogeneity matters for their role in asset pricing. The leverage of foreign-headquartered dealers in the United States entirely drive the predictive power on exchange rates, while the same measure for domestic U.S.-headquartered dealers is insignificant. The leverage of foreign-headquartered dealers also has more predictive power for some other assets. We ...
Working Paper
Monetary Policy Uncertainty and Monetary Policy Surprises
Monetary policy uncertainty affects the transmission of monetary policy shocks to longer-term nominal and real yields. For a given monetary policy shock, the reaction of yields is more pronounced when the level of monetary policy uncertainty is low. Primary dealers and other investors adjust their interest rate positions more when monetary policy uncertainty is low than when uncertainty is high. These portfolio adjustments likely explain the larger pass-through of a monetary policy shock to bond yields when uncertainty is low. These findings shed new light on the role that monetary policy ...
Working Paper
The Effect of Primary Dealer Constraints on Intermediation in the Treasury Market
Using confidential microdata, we show that shocks to primary dealers’ risk-bearing constraints have significant effects on the US Treasury securities market. In response to tighter constraints, dealers reduce their Treasury positions, triggering a reduction in aggregate turnover and an increase in bid–ask spreads. These effects are more pronounced in securities that contribute more to the utilization of risk constraints. The impaired intermediation also affects Treasury yields, amplifying the yield response to net demand shifts. Moreover, tighter dealer constraints weaken Treasury auction ...