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Working Paper
The Bronx is Burning: Urban Disinvestment Effects of the Fair Access to Insurance Requirements
Ellen, Ingrid Gould; Hartley, Daniel; Lin, Jeffrey; You, Wei (2024-12-16)
In response to private insurers’ postwar withdrawal from urban neighborhoods, roughly half of U.S. states developed programs in the late 1960s that offered residual property insurance to property owners denied in the private market. These plans, known as Fair Access to Insurance Requirements (FAIR) plans after 1968, inadvertently encouraged moral hazard through underwriting restrictions, risk pooling, and generous payouts. We use a triple-difference design to estimate FAIR’s impact, comparing: (1) pre- and post-FAIR participation periods, (2) neighborhoods likely offered FAIR plans versus ...
Working Paper Series , Paper WP 2024-25

Speech
Some observations about policy lessons from the crisis
Plosser, Charles I. (2009-12-04)
Presented by Charles I. Plosser, President and Chief Executive Officer, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, The Philadelphia Fed Policy Forum: Policy Lessons from the Economic and Financial Crisis, December 4, 2009
Speech , Paper 32

Working Paper
Optimal Social Insurance and Rising Labor Market Risk
Scheffel, Martin; Krebs, Tom (2019-02-01)
This paper analyzes the optimal response of the social insurance system to a rise in labor market risk. To this end, we develop a tractable macroeconomic model with risk-free physical capital, risky human capital (labor market risk) and unobservable effort choice affecting the distribution of human capital shocks (moral hazard). We show that constrained optimal allocations are simple in the sense that they can be found by solving a static social planner problem. We further show that constrained optimal allocations are the equilibrium allocations of a market economy in which the government ...
Opportunity and Inclusive Growth Institute Working Papers , Paper 18

Working Paper
Verifying the state of financing constraints: evidence from U.S. business credit contracts
Meisenzahl, Ralf R. (2011)
Which of the strategies for financing constraints in economic models is the most empirically plausible? This paper tests two commonly used models of financing constraints, costly state verification (Townsend, 1979) and moral hazard (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997), using a comprehensive data set of US small business credit contracts. The data include detailed information about the business, its owner, bank balance sheet information, and the terms of credit. In line with the predictions of models of financing constraints, I find that an additional dollar of net worth accounts for about 30 cents of ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2011-04

Journal Article
Research spotlight: Ties that bind
Sablik, Timothy (2011-07)
Related links: https://www.richmondfed.org/-/media/richmondfedorg/publications/research/econ_focus/2011/q3/research_spotlight_weblinks.cfm
Econ Focus , Volume 15 , Issue 3Q , Pages 11

Working Paper
Bank liability insurance schemes before 1865
Weber, Warren E. (2010)
Prior to the Civil War several states established bank liability insurance schemes of two basic types. One was an insurance fund, in which member banks paid into a state-run fund that would pay losses of bank creditors. The other was a mutual guarantee system, in which survivor banks were legally responsible the liabilities of any bank that became insolvent. Both schemes did well at insuring bank creditors, but neither prevented bank panics. Bank failure rates were somewhat higher for banks that were part of these schemes. The experience with these schemes shows that regulatory incentives ...
Working Papers , Paper 679

Working Paper
Risk-Shifting, Regulation, and Government Assistance
Sharma, Padma (2019-11-26)
This paper examines an episode when policy response to a financial crisis effectively incentivized financial institutions to reallocate their portfolios toward safe assets. Following a shift to a regime of enhanced regulation and scaled-down public assistance during the savings and loan crisis in 1989, I find that thrifts with a high probability of failure increased their composition of safe assets relative to thrifts with a low probability of failure. The findings also show a shift to safe assets among stock thrifts relative to mutual thrifts, thereby providing evidence of risk-shifting from ...
Research Working Paper , Paper RWP 19-10

Discussion Paper
Introducing a Series on Large and Complex Banks
Morgan, Donald P. (2014-03-25)
The chorus of criticism levied against mega-banks has, in some cases, outrun the research needed to back the criticism. To help the research catch up with the rhetoric, financial economists here at the New York Fed have engaged in a systematic study of the economics of large and complex banks and their resolution in the event of failure. The result of those efforts is a collection of eleven papers, each of which was subject to review (internal and external). The papers are now online in our Economic Policy Review. Today, we begin a two-week series of posts that present the key findings of ...
Liberty Street Economics , Paper 201404325b

Working Paper
Designing Unemployment Insurance for Developing Countries
Espino, Emilio; Sanchez, Juan M.; Cirelli, Fernando (2020-09-10)
The high incidence of informality in the labor markets of middle-income economies challenges the provision of unemployment protection. We show that, despite informational frictions, introducing an unemployment insurance savings account (UISA) system may provide substantial benefits. This system improves welfare by providing insurance to the unemployed and creating incentives to work in the formal sector. The optimal scheme generates a reduction in unemployment (from 4 to 3 percent), an increase in formality (from 68 to 72 percent), and a rise in total output (by 4 percent). Overall, ...
Working Papers , Paper 2018-006

Working Paper
Employment Dynamics in a Signaling Model with Workers' Incentives
Weingarden, Alison E. (2017-04)
Many firms adjust employment in a "lumpy" manner -- infrequently and in large bursts. In this paper, I show that lumpy adjustments can arise from concerns about the incentives of remaining workers. Specifically, I develop a model in which a firm's productivity depends on its workers' effort and workers' income prospects depend on the firm's profitability. I use this model to analyze the consequences of demand shocks that are observed by the firm but not by its workers, who can only try to infer the firm's profitability from its employment decisions. I show that the resulting signaling model ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2017-040

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