Search Results
Working Paper
Employment, Wages and Optimal Monetary Policy
We study optimal monetary policy when the empirical evidence leaves the policymaker uncertain whether the true data-generating process is given by a model with sticky wages or a model with search and matching frictions in the labor market. Unless the policymaker is almost certain about the search and matching model being the correct data-generating process, the policymaker chooses to stabilize wage inflation at the expense of price inflation, a policy resembling the policy that is optimal in the sticky wage model, regardless of the true model. This finding reflects the greater sensitivity of ...
Working Paper
Growth and Welfare Gains from Financial Integration Under Model Uncertainty
We build a robustness (RB) version of the Obstfeld (1994) model to study the effects of financial integration on growth and welfare. Our model can account for the empirically observed heterogeneity in the relationship between growth and volatility for different countries. The calibrated model shows that financial integration leads to significantly larger gains in growth and welfare for advanced countries than developing countries, with some developing countries experiencing growth and welfare loss in financial integration. Our analytical solutions help uncover the key mechanisms by which this ...
Working Paper
Doubts about the Model and Optimal Policy
This paper analyzes optimal policy in setups where both the leader and the follower have doubts about the probability model of uncertainty. I illustrate the methodology in two environments: a) an industry populated with a large firm and many small firms in a competitive fringe, where both types of firms doubt the probability model of demand shocks, and b) a general equilibrium economy, where a policymaker taxes linearly the labor income of a representative household in order to finance an exogenous stream of stochastic spending shocks. The policymaker can distrust the probability model of ...
Discussion Paper
Choosing the Right Policy in Real Time (Why That’s Not Easy)
As an economist, you make policy recommendations at any point in time that depend on what model of the economy you have in mind and on your assessment of the state of the economy. One can see these points play out in the current discussion about the timing of interest rate liftoff and the speed of the subsequent renormalization. If you think nominal rigidities are not all that important, you are likely to conclude that accommodative policies won’t do much for growth but will generate inflation. Similarly, if you are convinced that the economy is already firing on all cylinders, you may see ...
Working Paper
On Monetary Policy, Model Uncertainty, and Credibility
This paper studies the design of optimal time-consistent monetary policy in an economy where the planner and a representative household are faced with model uncertainty: While they are able to construct and agree on a reference model (probability distribution) governing the evolution of the exogenous state of the economy, a representative household has fragile beliefs and is averse to model uncertainty. In such environments, management of households' expectations becomes an active channel of optimal policymaking per se. A central banker who respects the fact that private sector models are ...
Discussion Paper
Combining Models for Forecasting and Policy Analysis
Model uncertainty is pervasive. Economists, bloggers, policymakers all have different views of how the world works and what economic policies would make it better. These views are, like it or not, models. Some people spell them out in their entirety, equations and all. Others refuse to use the word altogether, possibly out of fear of being falsified. No model is “right,” of course, but some models are worse than others, and we can have an idea of which is which by comparing their predictions with what actually happened. If you are open-minded, you may actually want to combine models in ...
Journal Article
Model Uncertainty and Policy Design
This article illustrates the main challenges and forces that emerge in optimal policy design when there are doubts about the probability model of uncertainty. Model doubts can stem from either the side of the public or the side of the policymaker, and they can give rise to cautious probabilistic assessments. A basic idea that surfaces in setups with model uncertainty is the management of the public's pessimistic expectations by the policymaker. The article also presents several implications of this idea.