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Report
Banking globalization, monetary transmission, and the lending channel
The globalization of banking in the United States is influencing the monetary transmission mechanism both domestically and in foreign markets. Using quarterly information from all U.S. banks filing call reports between 1980 and 2006, we show that globalized banks activate internal capital markets with their overseas affiliates to insulate themselves partially from changes in domestic liquidity conditions. The existence of these internal capital markets directly contributes to an international propagation of domestic liquidity shocks to lending by affiliated banks abroad. While these results ...
Report
Banking globalization, transmission, and monetary policy autonomy
International financial linkages, particularly through global bank flows, generate important questions about the consequences for economic and financial stability, including the ability of countries to conduct autonomous monetary policy. I address the monetary autonomy issue in the context of the international policy trilemma: Countries seek three typically desirable but jointly unattainable objectives?stable exchange rates, free international capital mobility, and monetary policy autonomy oriented toward, and effective at, achieving domestic goals. I argue that global banking entails some ...
Journal Article
Transmission of Sovereign Risk to Bank Lending
Banks hold a significant exposure to their own sovereigns. An increase in sovereign risk may hurt banks' balance sheets, causing a decrease in lending and a decline in economic activity. We quantify the transmission of sovereign risk to bank lending and provide new evidence about the effect of sovereign risk on economic outcomes. We consider the 1999 Marmara earthquake in Turkey as an exogenous shock leading to an increase in Turkey's default risk. Our empirical estimates show that, for banks holding a higher amount of government securities, the exogenous change in sovereign default risk ...
Working Paper
Sovereign Risk and Bank Lending: Theory and Evidence from a Natural Disaster
We quantify the sovereign-bank doom loop by using the 1999 Marmara earthquake as an exogenousshock leading to an increase in Turkey’s default risk. Our theoretical model illustrates that for banks withhigher exposure to government securities, a higher sovereign default risk implies lower net worth andtightening financial constraint. Our empirical estimates confirm the model’s predictions, showing that theexogenous change in sovereign default risk tightens banks’ financial constraints significantly for banks thathold a higher amount of government securities. The resulting tighter bank ...