Search Results
Working Paper
The Evolution of the Federal Reserve Swap Lines since 1962
In this paper, we describe the evolution of the Federal Reserve?s swap lines from their inception in 1962 as a mechanism to forestall claims on US gold reserves under Bretton Woods to their use during the Great Recession as a means of extending emergency dollar liquidity. We describe the Federal Reserve?s successes and failures. We argue that swaps calm crisis situations by both supplementing foreign countries? dollar reserves and by signaling central-bank cooperation. We show how swaps exposed the Federal Reserve to conditionality and raised fears that they bypassed the Congressional ...
The Speed of Discount Window Lending: A Look Back at 1985
The 1985 thrift crises in Ohio and Maryland show how the Fed, as a lender of last resort, took proactive steps to enhance the effectiveness of its discount window.
Discussion Paper
The Recent Rise in Discount Window Borrowing
The Federal Reserve’s primary credit program—offered through its “discount window” (DW)—provides temporary short-term funding to fundamentally sound banks. Historically, loan activity has been low during normal times due to a variety of factors, including the DW’s status as a back-up source of liquidity with a relatively punitive interest rate, the stigma attached to DW borrowing from the central bank, and, since 2008, elevated levels of reserves in the banking system. However, beginning in 2022, DW borrowing under the primary credit program increased notably in comparison to past ...
Report
Can Discount Window Stigma Be Cured? An Experimental Investigation
A core responsibility of a central bank is to ensure financial stability by acting as the “lender of last resort” through its Discount Window. The Discount Window, however, has not been effective because its usage is stigmatized. In this paper, we study experimentally how such stigma can be cured. We find that, once a Discount Window facility is stigmatized, removing stigma is difficult. This result is consistent with the Federal Reserve’s experiences which have been unsuccessful at removing the stigma associated with its Discount Window.
Working Paper
The (Unintended?) Consequences of the Largest Liquidity Injection Ever
We study the design of lender of last resort interventions and show that the provision of long-term liquidity incentivizes purchases of high-yield short-term securities by banks. Using a unique security-level data set, we find that the European Central Bank?s three-year Long-Term Refinancing Operation incentivized Portuguese banks to purchase short-term domestic government bonds that could be pledged to obtain central bank liquidity. This "collateral trade" effect is large, as banks purchased short-term bonds equivalent to 8.4% of amount outstanding. The resumption of public debt issuance ...
Discussion Paper
Which Dealers Borrowed from the Fed’s Lender-of-Last-Resort Facilities?
During the 2007-08 financial crisis, the Fed established lending facilities designed to improve market functioning by providing liquidity to nondepository financial institutions—the first lending targeted to this group since the 1930s. What was the financial condition of the dealers that borrowed from these facilities? Were they healthy institutions behaving opportunistically or were they genuinely distressed? In published research, we find that dealers in a weaker financial condition were more likely to participate than healthier ones and tended to borrow more. Our findings reinforce the ...
Journal Article
Federal Reserve: Central Bank Lending Lessons from the 2023 Bank Crisis
In the spring of 2023, a pair of fast-moving bank runs threatened to spark a widespread financial panic. On March 9, the 16th largest bank in the country, Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) in Santa Clara, Calif., lost a quarter of its deposits in a single day. It was set to lose another 62 percent of deposits the following day before it was closed by regulators. On March 10, New York-based Signature Bank experienced a similarly rapid flight of 20 percent of its deposits. It was closed by regulators on March 12.
Report
Discount Window Stigma After the Global Financial Crisis
We study Discount Window (DW) stigma, the reluctance to access the Federal Reserve’s lender-of-last resort facility, between 2014 and 2024. Despite increased usage since 2020, we find conclusive evidence that the DW is stigmatized, especially among smaller banks and when financial markets experience disruptions. In particular, evidence of DW stigma emerged months before the 2023 banking turmoil and had not subsided a year later. We also identify new determinants and consequences of DW stigma. The implications of these results for the provision of emergency liquidity are discussed.
Discussion Paper
Options of Last Resort
During the global financial crisis of 2007-08, collateral markets became illiquid, making it difficult for dealers to obtain short-term funding to finance their positions. As lender of last resort, the Federal Reserve responded with various programs to promote liquidity in these markets, including the Primary Dealer Credit Facility and the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF). In this post, we describe an additional and rarely discussed liquidity facility introduced by the Fed during the crisis: the TSLF Options Program (TOP). The TOP was unique among crisis-period liquidity facilities in ...
Discussion Paper
Can Discount Window Stigma Be Cured?
One of the core responsibilities of central banks is to act as “lender of last resort” to the financial system. In the U.S., the Federal Reserve has been operating as a lender of last resort through its “discount window” (DW) for more than a century. Historically, however, the DW has been plagued by stigma—banks’ reluctance to use the DW, even for benign reasons, out of concerns that it could be interpreted as a sign of financial weakness. In this post, we report on new research showing that once a DW facility is stigmatized, removing that stigma is difficult.