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Report
Insurance, Weather, and Financial Stability
In this paper, we introduce a model to study the interaction between insurance and banking. We build on the Federal Crop Insurance Act of 1980, which significantly expanded and restructured the decades-old federal crop insurance program and adverse weather shocks – over-exposure of crops to heat and acute weather events – to investigate some insights from our model. Banks increased lending to the agricultural sector in counties with higher insurance coverage after 1980, even when affected by adverse weather shocks. Further, while they increased risky lending, they were sufficiently ...
Report
Physical Climate Risk Factors and an Application to Measuring Insurers’ Climate Risk Exposure
We construct a novel physical risk factor using a portfolio of REITs, long on those with properties highly exposed to climate risk and short on those with less exposure. Combined with a transition risk factor, we assess U.S. insurers’ climate risk through operations and $13 trillion in asset holdings. Estimating dynamic climate betas, we find higher stock return sensitivity to the physical risk among insurers operating in riskier regions and to transition risk among those holding more brown assets. Using these betas, we calculate capital shortfalls under climate stress scenarios, offering ...
Report
Anxiety in the face of risk
We model an ?anxious? agent as one who is more risk averse with respect to imminent risks than with respect to distant risks. Based on a utility function that captures individual subjects? behavior in experiments, we provide a tractable theory relaxing the restriction of constant risk aversion across horizons and show that it generates rich implications. We first apply the model to insurance markets and explain the high premia for short-horizon insurance. Then, we show that costly delegated portfolio management, investment advice, and withdrawal fees emerge as endogenous features and ...
Working Paper
Insurance and Inequality with Persistent Private Information
This paper studies the implications of optimal insurance provision for long-run welfare and inequality in economies with persistent private information. We consider a model in which a principal insures an agent whose privately observed endowment follows an ergodic, finite Markov chain. The optimal contract always induces immiseration: the agent’s consumption and utility decrease without bound. Under positive serial correlation, the optimal contract also features backloaded high-powered incentives: the sensitivity of the agent’s utility with respect to his report increases without bound. ...
Journal Article
A Method for Estimating the Price of Stablecoin Insurance
As crypto assets such as stablecoins have gained traction in recent years, they have also raised financial stability concerns. The attention has likely been motivated by a steady stream of stablecoin collapses, which are essentially bank runs. One approach to mitigating this risk could be to insure stablecoins in a way similar to bank deposits—that is, with a third-party guarantee to cover the depositor’s (or coin-holder’s) losses should the bank (or issuer) collapse. Because stablecoins have many functional similarities to bank deposits, the theory underlying deposit insurance pricing ...
Working Paper
Dissecting Idiosyncratic Earnings Risk
This paper examines whether nonlinear and non-Gaussian features of earnings dynamics are caused by hours or hourly wages. Our findings from the Norwegian administrative and survey data are as follows: (i) Nonlinear mean reversion in earnings is driven by the dynamics of hours worked rather than wages since wage dynamics are close to linear, while hours dynamics are nonlinear—negative changes to hours are transitory, while positive changes are persistent. (ii) Large earnings changes are driven equally by hours and wages, whereas small changes are associated mainly with wage shocks. (iii) ...
Briefing
How Well Insured Are Older Americans?
Using a combination of survey and administrative data, we calculate the portion of medical expenditures that retirees pay out of pocket. We find that retirees are mostly well insured against medical spending risk, with over 80 percent of their spending covered by Medicare, Medicaid or other insurers. We also find, however, that individuals with extremely high medical expenses pay a larger — not smaller — share out of pocket than those with more average expenses. Much of this difference is attributable to nursing home stays, which are typically uncovered by most insurers.
Working Paper
Equilibrium with Mutual Organizations in Adverse Selection Economies
An equilibrium concept in the Debreu (1954) theory-of-value tradition is developed for a class of adverse selection economies and applied to the Spence signaling and Rothschild-Stiglitz (1976) adverse selection environments. The equilibrium exists and is optimal. Further, all equilibria have the same individual type utility vector. The economies are large with a finite number of types that maximize expected utility on an underlying commodity space. An implication of the analysis is that the invisible hand works for this class of adverse selection economies.
Working Paper
Financial Incentives, Hospital Care, and Health Outcomes: Evidence from Fair Pricing Laws
It is often assumed that financial incentives of healthcare providers affect the care they deliver, but this issue is surprisingly difficult to study. The recent enactment of state laws that limit how much hospitals can charge uninsured patients provide a unique opportunity. Using an event study framework and panel data from the Nationwide Inpatient Sample, we examine whether these regulations lead to reductions in the amount and quality of care given to uninsured patients. We find that the introduction of a fair pricing law leads to a seven to nine percent reduction in the average length of ...
Report
Barriers to household risk management: evidence from India
Financial engineering offers the potential to significantly reduce the consumption fluctuations faced by individuals, households, and firms. Yet much of this potential remains unfulfilled. This paper studies the adoption of an innovative rainfall insurance product designed to compensate low-income Indian farmers in the event of insufficient rainfall during the primary monsoon season. We first document relatively low adoption of this new risk management product: Only 5-10 percent of households purchase the insurance, even though they overwhelmingly cite rainfall variability as their most ...