Search Results
Journal Article
Pink and Poverty Taxes on Marriage
A "pink tax" is the extra cost charged for goods and services esigned for women. In this research, we expand the scope of this pink tax by examining gender and income differentials in marriage taxes. A marriage tax reflects the decline in spending power as a result of the difference in taxes and transfer benefits that arise from marriage. We use a lifetime measure of the marriage tax and show that low-income females with children are penalized the most, with a loss of 3.35 percent of their lifetime resources because of marriage. This marriage tax also makes a significant difference to their ...
Journal Article
Alternative Refund Settlement Products May Compromise Asset-Building Goals
High-cost, short-term loans such as the refund anticipation loan (RAL) have historically been popular with low-income filers. RALs are based on the taxpayer's expected refund and are issued at the time of filing. They allow the taxpayer to receive an anticipated refund earlier, in the form of a loan. These products have often been associated with high prices and extra filing costs. Nationwide, 7.2 million taxpayers received RALs in 2009, and 87 percent of those were low income.
Working Paper
The Impact of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act on Local Home Values
This paper simulates changes to neighborhood home prices resulting from reforms to tax preferences in the recently passed Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA). The simulation uses federal tax data summarized at a fine geography to impute homeowner rents at the zip code level across six income classes. Employing a user cost framework, I model rents as a function of prices under the old tax law and under the TCJA. While the average price impact of the TCJA is found to be ?5.7 percent, local effects range from 0 to ?23 percent across zip codes. Variation across income class is also large. Simulations by ...
Working Paper
Is Our Fiscal System Discouraging Marriage? A New Look at the Marriage Tax
We develop, apply, and test a new measure of the marriage tax: the reduction in future spending from getting married. Our measure is a comprehensive, actuarial (expected) present value. It incorporates all major and most minor US tax and benefit programs, weighing the present value of additional net taxes from marrying along each marital survivor path by the path’s probability. And it assumes clone marriage—marrying oneself—to ensure the living-standard loss from marrying is unaffected by spousal choice. We calculate our marriage tax for young respondents using the Survey of Consumer ...
Briefing
How Can We Make a Progressive Tax System More Efficient?
In the U.S., income tax rates rise as households earn more. However, such a system means workers have a reduced incentive to increase their earnings. In this article, I discuss a finding from one of my papers that explores the possible effects of targeting tax rates on additional characteristics besides income.