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How the U.S. Treasury Futures Market and the Basis Trade Could Be Affected by the Treasury Clearing Mandate: Part 2—The Possible Role of Cross-Margining
In part 2 of this Chicago Fed Letter series, I delve further into the implications of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) recent mandate requiring transactions for both U.S. Treasury cash securities and repurchase agreements (repos) to be cleared and settled through an authorized central counterparty (CCP). In part 1, I provided a primer on the Treasury futures market and the Treasury cash–futures basis trade and touched on the possible impact of the SEC mandate on both. Here, I explain in greater detail how the mandate could affect the cost and functioning of the basis ...
Working Paper
Did life insurers benefit from TARP or regulatory forbearance during the financial crisis of 2008–2009?
Life insurers? odds of being placed under regulatory control (for example, conservatorship or receivership) during the financial crisis years of 2008 and 2009 increased with deteriorating fundamentals at a much higher rate than during normal times or during the previous recession. However, no life insurer in the sample belonging to a life insurance holding company system (LIHCS) in receipt of TARP funds experienced such insolvency issues, and life insurers with poor and deteriorating performance that belonged to a LIHCS in receipt of TARP funds received increased capital inflows during the ...
Working Paper
What Are the Financial Systemic Implications of Access and Non-Access to Federal Reserve Deposit Accounts for Central Counterparties?
In this working paper, I examine the interconnections between designated derivatives central counterparties (CCPs) with Federal Reserve deposit accounts and non-designated CCPs and the potential financial stability implications. This working paper notes the interconnections between the non-designated and designated derivatives CCPs through their clearing members and the commercial custodial banks they utilize to hold and transfer collateral. The paper then identifies additional potential contagion risks and financial stability risks, including liquidity risk, market risk, concentration risk, ...